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Ransom Kidnapping

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Definition

Kidnapping in its widest sense occurs when a person carries away another person by force or fraud with the intent to exploit the abduction for a variety of purposes. Ransom kidnapping refers to a situation in which the overriding purpose for the act is a payment (usually a sum of money) for the release of the hostage and the enrichment of the perpetrators. It is a serious crime causing not only economic losses but also pain and suffering, often in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and major depression (MDD), to the victims and their families. Occasionally it ends in death.

Introduction

Kidnapping for ransom, also referred to as economic kidnapping or profit kidnapping, is a predatory crime carried out mostly by criminal organizations, rather than single offenders, usually after careful planning of the various stages of the (illegal) production process. The latter, in perfect business style, begins with a market analysis designed to identify the most...

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Correspondence to Marco Vannini .

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Vannini, M., Detotto, C., McCannon, B. (2021). Ransom Kidnapping. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_576-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_576-2

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Ransom Kidnapping
    Published:
    04 May 2022

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_576-2

  2. Original

    Ransom Kidnapping
    Published:
    07 March 2015

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_576-1