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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics pp 1–12Cite as

Ransom Kidnapping

Abstract

The practice of kidnapping for ransom, a predatory crime carried out mostly by criminal organizations, is a salient phenomenon in many regions of the world. It causes serious harm not only to victims and their families but also to private and social capital. As a paradigmatic rational crime involving negotiations, the incentives to commit the crime and the way it ends change with the probability and severity of punishment, the kidnapper’s willingness to kill the hostage, and the value of the hostage life from the point of view of the family. Limiting the family’s ability to pay reduces the frequency of the offense but opens the possibility of unintended consequences in terms of fatalities and duration of abduction.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and CRENoS, University of Sassari, 07100, Sassari, Italy

    Marco Vannini

  2. DiSea – CRENoS, University of Sassari, via torre tonda, 34, 07100, Sassari, Sardinia, Italy

    Claudio Detotto

  3. Saint Bonaventure University, St Bonaventure, NY, USA

    Bryan McCannon

Authors
  1. Marco Vannini
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  2. Claudio Detotto
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  3. Bryan McCannon
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Marco Vannini .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Lehrst. Finanzwissenschaft/ Finanzsoziologie, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Thüringen, Germany

    Jürgen Backhaus

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© 2015 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Vannini, M., Detotto, C., McCannon, B. (2015). Ransom Kidnapping. In: Backhaus, J. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_576-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_576-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Ransom Kidnapping
    Published:
    04 May 2022

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_576-2

  2. Original

    Ransom Kidnapping
    Published:
    07 March 2015

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_576-1

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