Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate

Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes

  • Dan S. Felsenthal
  • Hannu Nurmi

Part of the SpringerBriefs in Economics book series (BRIEFSECONOMICS)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xv
  2. Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
    Pages 1-6
  3. Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
    Pages 7-14
  4. Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
    Pages 15-25
  5. Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
    Pages 125-134

About this book


This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.


Voting Voting procedure Voting paradox Elections Vulnerability to voting paradox Non-ranked voting procedures Ranked voting procedures Condorcet-consistent voting procedures

Authors and affiliations

  • Dan S. Felsenthal
    • 1
  • Hannu Nurmi
    • 2
  1. 1.School of Political SciencesUniversity of HaifaHaifaIsrael
  2. 2.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of TurkuTurkuFinland

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information The Author(s) 2018
  • Publisher Name Springer, Cham
  • eBook Packages Economics and Finance
  • Print ISBN 978-3-319-74032-4
  • Online ISBN 978-3-319-74033-1
  • Series Print ISSN 2191-5504
  • Series Online ISSN 2191-5512
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
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