Game of Regional Environmental Policy: Europe and US

  • Elias Asproudis
  • Nadeem Khan
  • Nada Korac-Kakabadse


We analyse a different timing implementation of environmental regulation and compare the effects on the markets from a policy innovation perspective. The paper addresses the question: Should a regulator try to commit to a policy (ex-ante regulation) or rather adapt its policy to a firm’s decisions (ex-post)? The findings are of interest towards improving regulatory effectiveness and economics efficiencies, e.g. for the transatlantic regional relationship between EU and USA. Our findings highlight differences in policy timing between markets may be harmful. The transatlantic regulators should consider the timing of the policy innovation for the achievement of mutual benefits.


Regulation Policy innovation Timing Transatlantic agreement 

JEL Classification

D4 L1 L51 O3 Q5 



We would like to thank the editor and the anonymous referee for the constructive com- ments for the improvement of this paper. Also, we would like to thank participants at the EAERE 2016 and ASSET 2014 for comments and suggestions on previous versions of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elias Asproudis
    • 1
  • Nadeem Khan
    • 2
  • Nada Korac-Kakabadse
    • 2
  1. 1.School of Management, Department of EconomicsUniversity of SwanseaSwanseaUK
  2. 2.Henley Business SchoolUniversity of ReadingReadingUK

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