Skip to main content

Unobservability Hypothesis, The (Vonk and Povinelli, 2006)

  • Living reference work entry
  • First Online:
Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science
  • 177 Accesses

Definition

The unobservability hypothesis (Vonk and Povinelli 2006) stipulates that one essential difference between the cognitive capacities of humans and nonhumans is that humans, but not nonhumans, are capable of reasoning about theoretical entities that cannot take on physical form. Such entities consist of hypothetical constructs such as traits, physical forces, and mental states.

Introduction

Comparative and cognitive researchers have long debated the facets of human cognition that allow for our uniquely human abilities. Scientists quibble over the extent to which human cognition is qualitatively distinct from that of nonhumans (see Penn et al. 2008and related commentaries), but they cannot feasibly deny that humans stand alone with regard to the capacity to alter their environments, create technology, devise symbolic systems for communication, and so on. What is more contentious is identifying the cognitive trait or suite of traits that allowed for such distinctiveness in the...

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Buckner, C. (2015, Oct. 12) Commentary on Clatterbuck (Symposium on Hayley Clatterbuck: “Chimpanzee mindreading and the value of parsimonious mental models”. Retrieved from http://philosophyofbrains.com/2015/10/12/symposium-on-hayley-clatterbuck-chimpanzee-mindreading-and-the-value-of-parsimonious-mental-models.aspx

  • Heyes, C. M. (1998). Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 101–134.

    PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Karg, K., Schmelz, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2015). The goggles experiment: Can chimpanzees use self-experience to infer what a competitor can see? Animal Behaviour, 105, 211–221.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lurz, R. W., & Krachun, C. (2011). How could we know whether nonhuman primates understand others’ internal goals and intentions? Solving Povinelli’s problem. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2, 449–481.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Penn, D. C., & Povinelli, D. J. (2007). On the lack of evidence that non-human animals possess anything remotely resembling a ‘theory of mind’. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 362, 731–744.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Penn, D. C., Holyoak, K. J., & Povinelli, D. J. (2008). Darwin’s mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 31, 109–130.

    PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Povinelli, D. J., & Vonk, J. (2004). We don’t need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee’s mind. Mind & Language, 19, 1–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 515–526.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vonk, J. (in review). When theorizing about theory of mind produces a stalemate: A bottom-up approach to the question of whether animal brains read minds. Invited chapter for F. Grasso, J. E. Burgos, O. Garcia-Leal, & R. Akram (Eds.), The mind-reading brains. NY, NY: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vonk, J., & Povinelli, D. J. (2006). Similarity and difference in the conceptual systems of primates: The Unobservability hypothesis. In E. Wasserman & T. Zentall (Eds.), Oxford handbook of comparative cognition: Experimental explorations of animal intelligence (pp. 363–387). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vonk, J., & Povinelli, D. J. (2011). Preliminary investigations of cognitive plasticity: Social and physical causality in home-reared chimpanzees. In N. Eilan, H. Lerman, & J. Roessler (Eds.), Perception, causation, and objectivity. Issues in philosophy and psychology (pp. 342–367). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jennifer Vonk .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this entry

Cite this entry

Vonk, J. (2016). Unobservability Hypothesis, The (Vonk and Povinelli, 2006). In: Weekes-Shackelford, V., Shackelford, T., Weekes-Shackelford, V. (eds) Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3115-1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3115-1

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-16999-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Behavioral Science and PsychologyReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Publish with us

Policies and ethics