Introduction
Rational choice theory, the dominant theoretical paradigm in most social sciences, is a framework for understanding and often formally modeling social and economic behavior. Choice and utility are alternative normative foundational notions for rational choice theories in economics, political science, moral philosophy, and public policy. They are, to an extent, inter-derivable. If economic utility, or psychological value, is viewed as basic, then choice can be explained as aiming to maximize utility or value. If choice is viewed as basic, then a utility or value scale can be derived such that preferred options have higher utility. These derivations only hold given that certain consistency conditions, such as transitivity, hold in patterns of choice. Both choice- and utility-based normative (rational) theories of how people, governments, or societies should act come under strain if these...
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Vlaev, I. (2017). Value Attributes. In: Shackelford, T., Weekes-Shackelford, V. (eds) Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_1594-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_1594-1
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