Abstract
Quantitative studies are surveyed which indicate that the Court is biased towards political centralization. The econometric evidence shows that this bias is not due to a lack of political independence but to self-selection and vested interest. Various reforms are discussed which would reduce self-selection and vested interest, notably the requirement of judicial experience, delegation of judges from the highest national courts, and the establishment of a separate “Subsidiarity Court.”
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Vaubel, R. (2014). Court of Justice of the European Union. In: Backhaus, J. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_73-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_73-1
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Court of Justice of the European Union- Published:
- 31 October 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_73-2
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Court of Justice of the European Union- Published:
- 19 June 2014
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_73-1