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Keeping Promises and Contracts

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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Abstract

There are reasons for individuals to keep contractual promises beyond legal remedies and reputational concerns. This entry reviews the leading explanations of promise-keeping behavior as well as recent evidence for the latter as collected in laboratory experiments. In the end, it discusses avenues for future research and recent applications of the results collected so far for the design of contracts and their legal enforcement.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy, Amalienstraße 33, 80799, Munich, Germany

    Sergio Mittlaender

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  1. Sergio Mittlaender
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Correspondence to Sergio Mittlaender .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Dept DiGSPES, Univ del Piemonte Orientale Dept DiGSPES, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Mittlaender, S. (2017). Keeping Promises and Contracts. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_696-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_696-1

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  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Keeping Promises and Contracts
    Published:
    14 October 2021

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_696-2

  2. Original

    Keeping Promises and Contracts
    Published:
    21 August 2017

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_696-1

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