Abstract
Managers can stake a claim by committing to capital investments today that can influence their rivals’ behavior or take a “wait-and-see” or step-by-step approach to avoid possible adverse market consequences tomorrow. At the core of this corporate dilemma lies the classic trade-off between commitment and flexibility. This trade-off calls for a careful balancing of the merits of flexibility against those of commitment. This balancing is captured by option games.
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Chevalier-Roignant, B., Trigeorgis, L. (2021). Option Games: The Interface Between Optimal Stopping and Game Theory. In: Baillieul, J., Samad, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Systems and Control. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_41-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_41-2
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Option Games: The Interface Between Optimal Stopping and Game Theory- Published:
- 03 February 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_41-2
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Option Games: The Interface Between Optimal Stopping and Game Theory- Published:
- 21 May 2014
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_41-1