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Option Games: The Interface Between Optimal Stopping and Game Theory

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Encyclopedia of Systems and Control

Abstract

Managers can stake a claim by committing to capital investments today that can influence their rivals’ behavior or take a “wait-and-see” or step-by-step approach to avoid possible adverse market consequences tomorrow. At the core of this corporate dilemma lies the classic trade-off between commitment and flexibility. This trade-off calls for a careful balancing of the merits of flexibility against those of commitment. This balancing is captured by option games.

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Correspondence to Benoît Chevalier-Roignant .

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Chevalier-Roignant, B., Trigeorgis, L. (2021). Option Games: The Interface Between Optimal Stopping and Game Theory. In: Baillieul, J., Samad, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Systems and Control. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_41-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_41-2

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4471-5102-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-5102-9

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Option Games: The Interface Between Optimal Stopping and Game Theory
    Published:
    03 February 2021

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_41-2

  2. Original

    Option Games: The Interface Between Optimal Stopping and Game Theory
    Published:
    21 May 2014

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_41-1