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Part of the book series: NATO ASI Series ((ASID,volume 77))

Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to present an important solution concept for cooperative games, due to Lloyd S. Shapley (Shapley (1953)). In the first part, we will be looking at the transferable utility (TU) case, for which we will state the main theorem and study several examples. Afterwards, we will extend the axiomatic construction to the non-transferable utility (NTU) case.

The author is very grateful to J.F. Mertens, who prepared this chapter on the basis of the author’s presentation.

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References

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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Aumann, R.J. (1994). The Shapley Value. In: Mertens, JF., Sorin, S. (eds) Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis. NATO ASI Series, vol 77. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1656-7_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1656-7_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4442-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1656-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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