Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis

  • Jean-François Mertens
  • Sylvain Sorin

Part of the NATO ASI Series book series (ASID, volume 77)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-9
  2. Introduction

    1. Jean-François Mertens
      Pages 11-13
  3. The Core and The Bargaining Set

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 15-15
    2. Beth Allen, Sylvain Sorin
      Pages 17-33
    3. Jean-François Mertens
      Pages 47-50
    4. R. Vohra
      Pages 51-58
  4. The Value

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 59-59
    2. Robert J. Aumann
      Pages 61-66
    3. Jean-François Mertens
      Pages 81-94
    4. Sergiu Hart
      Pages 105-111
    5. Robert J. J. Aumann
      Pages 121-133
  5. The Cooperative Approach to Large Markets and Games

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 135-135
    2. Pradeep Dubey, Abraham Neyman
      Pages 137-144
  6. The Non-Cooperative Approach

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 207-207
    2. Beth Allen, Heracles Polemarchakis
      Pages 225-241
    3. Jean-François Mertens
      Pages 243-248
    4. Sylvain Sorin
      Pages 261-268

About this book


JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the "birth" of general equi­ librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech­ nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game.


bargaining calculus cooperative games equilibrium general equilibrium

Editors and affiliations

  • Jean-François Mertens
    • 1
  • Sylvain Sorin
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Center for Operations Research & EconometricsUniversité Catholique de LouvainLouvain-la-NeuveBelgium
  2. 2.Ecole Normale SupérieureParisFrance
  3. 3.Université Paris XNanterreFrance

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1994
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-90-481-4442-6
  • Online ISBN 978-94-017-1656-7
  • Series Print ISSN 0258-123X
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
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