Abstract
Strict Conceptual Role Theory is a radical theory of meaning, and as such naturally generates many unintuitive results. The accompanying pragmatic theory of concept change was designed to make the seemingly disastrous no-misrepresentation result more palatable. But there are many possible objections to be considered, and we must now see if we can adequately deal with them. In answering objections it becomes apparent that SCRT and its accompanying pragmatic theory of concept change look very much like a philosophical system. I take this to be a virtue of the theory, since system-building has a long history. (In science, systems are known by the perhaps less loaded term ‘paradigms’.) In spite of the many philosophers in this century (especially in analytic philosophy) who have denounced philosophical systems, these denunciations usually turn out to be philosophical systems themselves (the best example being Logical Positivism). The advantage of well-crafted systems is that they spin out their consequences and answers to objections with ease. Once immersed in the system it becomes very clear what one must say to a whole variety of objections. The danger of course is that the answers one must give may be unbelievable, and generate a reductio argument against the theory. I admit freely that many of the answers are pretty strange, as is the whole theory. But in evaluating them, we should remember why we needed to go to such extremes — all of the more intuitive and plausible theories of content fail to coherently ground misrepresentation.
What is a mistake but a kind of take?
— William James
It would be absolutely fatal if people meant the same things by their words. ...
It would be altogether incredibly inconvenient to have an unambiguous language, and therefore mercifully we have not got one.
— Bertrand Russell
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Perlman, M. (2000). Objections and Replies. In: Conceptual Flux. Studies in Cognitive Systems, vol 24. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9462-2_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9462-2_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5415-9
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