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Some Constraints on Embodied Analogical Understanding

  • Mark Johnson
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 197)

Abstract

Arguments over the cognitive status of analogy are strikingly similar to those that recur again and again in the endless debates about the reducibility of metaphor. This is not surprising, since, if we regard analogy as primarily a matter of underlying structural isomorphism or shared similarities, then metaphor can be seen as a type of analogical process in which we project structures from an experiential domain of one kind (the source-domain) onto a domain of another kind (the target domain). For the purposes of the kind of argument I am going to give, it is not necessary to make any sharp distinction between the analogical and the metaphorical, because I shall be focusing on something they both hold in common, namely, structural isomorphism between the source and target domains.

Keywords

Target Domain Image Schema Propositional Content Abstract Domain Balance Schema 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Donald Davidson, “What metaphors mean,” Critical Inquir. 5, no. 1 (1978), 31–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Donald Davidson, “What metaphors mean,” Critical Inquir. 5, no. 1 (1978), p. 47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    John Searle, “Metaphor,” in his Expression and Meanin. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 76–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    John Searle, “The background,” Ch. 5 in his Intentionalit. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Searle, “Metaphor,” 107–108.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Searle, “The background,” 149.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Paul Ricoeur, “The metaphorical process as cognition, imagination, and feeling,” Criticallnquiry., no. 1 (1978), 159.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reaso. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Earlier versions of the following analysis were worked out with George Lakoff. They appear in his Women, Fire, and Dangerous Thing. and in my The Body in the Mind. Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Ibid., Ch. 5.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Mark Johnson, The Body in the Min., Ch. 5.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Languag., trans. by Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    See, for example, Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imaginaton, and Reaso. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), esp. Ch. 6; George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Our Categories Reveal About the Min. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Ronald Langacker, Foundations of Cognitive Gramma. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1987).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark Johnson
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySouthern Illinois UniversityCarbondaleUSA

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