Abstract
Arguments over the cognitive status of analogy are strikingly similar to those that recur again and again in the endless debates about the reducibility of metaphor. This is not surprising, since, if we regard analogy as primarily a matter of underlying structural isomorphism or shared similarities, then metaphor can be seen as a type of analogical process in which we project structures from an experiential domain of one kind (the source-domain) onto a domain of another kind (the target domain). For the purposes of the kind of argument I am going to give, it is not necessary to make any sharp distinction between the analogical and the metaphorical, because I shall be focusing on something they both hold in common, namely, structural isomorphism between the source and target domains.
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Notes
Donald Davidson, “What metaphors mean,” Critical Inquir. 5, no. 1 (1978), 31–47.
Donald Davidson, “What metaphors mean,” Critical Inquir. 5, no. 1 (1978), p. 47.
John Searle, “Metaphor,” in his Expression and Meanin. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 76–116.
John Searle, “The background,” Ch. 5 in his Intentionalit. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
Searle, “Metaphor,” 107–108.
Searle, “The background,” 149.
Paul Ricoeur, “The metaphorical process as cognition, imagination, and feeling,” Criticallnquiry., no. 1 (1978), 159.
Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reaso. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
Earlier versions of the following analysis were worked out with George Lakoff. They appear in his Women, Fire, and Dangerous Thing. and in my The Body in the Mind.
Ibid., Ch. 5.
Mark Johnson, The Body in the Min., Ch. 5.
Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Languag., trans. by Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
See, for example, Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imaginaton, and Reaso. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), esp. Ch. 6; George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Our Categories Reveal About the Min. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Ronald Langacker, Foundations of Cognitive Gramma. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1987).
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© 1988 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Johnson, M. (1988). Some Constraints on Embodied Analogical Understanding. In: Helman, D.H. (eds) Analogical Reasoning. Synthese Library, vol 197. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7811-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7811-0_2
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