Reductionism as Negation of the Scientific Spirit

Abstract

The polemic accent implicit in the title of this essay must be understood as a statement addressed against an absolutization or excess, namely, the absolutization of a methodological approach which, in other respects, is fully legitimate and correct in itself, provided one remains conscious of its conditions of application and limits. This approach is the perspective of reduction, of which≪reductionism≫ (as in general for every ≪-ism≫) results in unjustified dogmatic generalization. But, because one may speak of reduction according to different meanings¹, it would be a difficult task to define reductionism by relying upon the various meanings of the concept of reduction. It is, therefore, easier to characterize the concept of reductionism directly, for it corresponds to an intellectual attitude, a genuine metaphysical vision, which is more fundamental and more ancient than the methodological approaches one could class under the epistemological notion of ≪reduction≫ and which, at bottom, is responsible for the very absolutization of which we have just spoken.