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On the Illogic of the Mental

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Philosophical Logic

Part of the book series: Tulane Studies in Philosophy ((TUSP,volume 16))

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Abstract

As the most irritating characteristic of some women is their immunity to masculine logic, so the most distressing feature of the mental is its resistance to any logic at all. Statements mentioning the mental do not submit to the same rules of inference as do statements mentioning only physical entities.

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References

  1. Brentano, Franz, “The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena,” Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, ed., Roderick Chisholm, Free Press, 1960, pp. 39–62.

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  2. Frege, Gottlob, “On Sense and Nominatum,” Readings in Philosophical Analysis, eds., Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, Apple ton-Century-Crofts, 1949, p. 90.

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  3. Chisholm, Roderick, “Sentences about Believing,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II, University of Minnesota Press, 1958, p. 511.

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  4. Linsky, Leonard, “Substitutivity,” The Journal of Philosophy, March 18, 1965, PP. 139–45.

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  5. Quine, Willard, “Reference and Modality,” From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, 1953, pp. 139–160.

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  6. Cf., Strawson, Peter, Introduction to Logical Theory, Methuen and Co., 1952, P. 3.

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  7. Bergman apparently treats all consciousness as “propositional,” quoting the propositional contents of acts of consciousness in his ideal language. See Bergman, Gustav, “Intentionality,” Meaning and Existence, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1960, pp. 3–39.

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  8. Cf., Ducasse, W. J., “Moore’s Refutation of Idealism,” The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. P. A. Schilpp, Library of Living Philosophers, 1942, pp. 223–252.

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© 1967 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Hocutt, M. (1967). On the Illogic of the Mental. In: Philosophical Logic. Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol 16. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3497-5_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3497-5_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-247-0290-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-3497-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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