Philosophical Logic

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-VII

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2. The Logic of Our Language

   • Robert L. Arrington

   Pages 1-17

3. Petitio in the Strife of Systems

   • Peter M. Burkholder

   Pages 19-31

4. Observations on the Uses of Order

   • Shannon Dubose

   Pages 33-36

5. Cultural Relativity and the Logic of Philosophy

   • James W. Dye

   Pages 37-52

6. A Material Theory of Reference

   • James K. Feibleman

   Pages 53-76

7. On Letting

   • Bertrand P. Helm

   Pages 77-91

8. On the Illogic of the Mental

   • Max Hocutt

   Pages 93-109

9. On the Use and Interpretation of Logical Symbols

   • Harold N. Lee

   Pages 111-122

10. Notes on a Past Logic of Time

    • Louise N. Roberts

    Pages 123-128

11. The Problem of Judgment in Husserl’s Later Thought

    • John C. Sallis

    Pages 129-152

12. Philosophical Logic and Psychological Satisfaction

    • Donald H. Weiss

    Pages 153-161

With this issue we initiate the policy of expanding the scope of Tulane Studies in Philosophy to include, in addition to the work of members of the department, contributions from philosophers who have earned advanced degrees from Tulane and who are now teaching in other colleges and universities. The Editor THE LOGIC OF OUR LANGUAGE ROBERT L. ARRINGTON Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus that "logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world. " 1 In line with his suggestion that a proposition is a 'picture', Wittgenstein argued that propositions 'show' the logical structure of the real. He was insistent, however, that "the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one. " 2 As a result of this we can misunderstand the structure of fact. Philosophical problems arise just when "the logic of our language is mis­ understood. " 3 It is common knowledge that much of this view of logic was rejected by Wittgenstein himself in the Philosophical Investi­ gations. There we are told that language has no ideal or sublime 4 logic which mirrors the structure of the extra-linguistic world. Consequently, inferences from the structure of language to the structure of that extra-linguistic world are invalid. Reality can be 'cut up' in any of a number of ways by language. Wittgenstein adopted a view of philosophy which would render that discipline a non-explanatory, non-critical study of the multiple ways in which language can be used.

• interpret
• logic
• philosophical logic
• philosophy

• Georgia State College, USA

  Robert L. Arrington

• Central Washington State College, USA

  Peter M. Burkholder

• Tulane University, USA

  Shannon Dubose, James K. Feibleman, Harold N. Lee, Louise N. Roberts

• Northern Illinois University, USA

  James W. Dye

• Southwest Missouri State College, USA

  Bertrand P. Helm

• University of Alabama, USA

  Max Hocutt

• Dequesne University, USA

  John C. Sallis

• Arlington State College, USA

  Donald H. Weiss

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