The lively conception (belief in A) is followed in the mind by the lively conceptions of some distinct C1,. . .,Ck.
Just m of these cases are seen to be B. Hume’s account assumes the principle of indifference. The alternatives in which B obtains are supposed to contribute equally to the strength of the belief in B. It is quite clear that this account is intended to be probabilistic, that is to conform to the laws.
If B is a necessary consequence of A, then the strength of belief in B given A is 1.
If B1 and B2 are incompatible in the presence of A, then (assuming conditional belief is defined in B1 given A and in B2 given A) the strength of belief in B1 or B2 given A is the sum of the strength of the beliefs in B1 given A and in B2 given A.
KeywordsProbability Judgment Propositional Theory Conditional Belief Mentalistic Account Partial Belief
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