Abstract
If I decide to have dinner at the Waldorf Astoria or to go to Italy for a vacation or to ask a certain young lady to marry me and provided that my decision to do one of these things does not involve breaking some prior engagement or obligation, it would not occur to anyone to describe my behavior as unjust. Indeed, before we can say that any decision, choice or judgment is unjust or that any law or regulation is unjust, we must be ready to set out the reasons that would justify this characterization, and the reasons must be acceptable to the audience we are addressing.
Reprinted by permission of New York University from Law, Reason and Justice: Essay in Legal Philosophy, edited by Graham Hughes, © 1969 by New York University.
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Notes
See A. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (1963), pp. 79–87; Perelman, Justice (1967), Chap. 2. (Chapter 3 of the present volume.)
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© 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Perelman, C., Berman, H.J. (1980). Justice and Reasoning. In: Justice, Law, and Argument. Synthese Library, vol 142. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9010-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9010-4_7
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