Abstract
During the last decade there has been a lively debate about the degree to which sociobiological theory is untestable due to the highly speculative and ad hoc nature of sociobiological explanations and, usually by inference from the explanatory cases, predictions — especially those concerning human behavior. In this paper, I examine this problem within the framework of the semantic conception of theories. I shall argue that a semantic conception of theories provides a more thoroughgoing analysis of this problem than the more familiar syntactical conception of theories. In particular, a semantic conception more accurately represents the relation between a theory and phenomena which, in this case, results in a clearer understanding of: the nature of the problem of the testability of sociobiological theory, the difference in explanatory success of the theory when applied to insects and to humans, and the kind of additional knowledge required in order to apply the theory successfully to human behavior.
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Notes
E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Belknap Press, Cambridge, 1975.
See E. Allen et al, ‘Sociobiology: Another Biological Determinism’, Bioscience 26 (1976), 182–186
R. M. Burian, ‘A Methodological Critique of Sociobiology’, in A. L. Caplan (ed.), The Sociobiology Debate, Harper & Row, New York, 1978, pp. 376–395
S. J. Gould, ‘Sociobiology: The Art of Storytelling’, New Scientist 80 (Nov. 16, 1978), 530–533
R. Lewontin, ‘Sociobiology: A Caricature of Darwinism’, in F. Suppe and P. D. Asquith (eds.), PSA 1976, vol. 2, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, 1977, pp. 22–31
M. Ruse, ‘Sociobiology: Sound Science or Muddled Metaphysics?’ in F. Suppe and P. D. Asquith (eds.), PSA 1976, vol. 2, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, 1977, pp. 48–73
M. Ruse, Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979
P. Thompson, ‘Is Sociobiology A Pseudoscience?’ in P. D. Asquith and R. N. Giere (eds.), PSA 1980, vol. 1, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, 1980, pp. 363–370.
The comments and arguments in this paper concentrate on explanation with little to no reference to prediction which is the concept most often associated with testability. I have concentrated on explanation for two reasons. First, those who have raised this criticism of sociobiology (see, for example, op. cit. ‘Sociobiology: A Caricature of Darwinism’ and op. cit. ‘Sociobiology: The Art of Storytelling’) have expounded it mostly in terms of the highly speculative and ad hoc character of sociobiological explanation. Second, nearly all the comments and arguments in this paper relating to explanation can be straightforwardly applied to prediction. Prediction and explanation are, with regard to the features discussed in this paper, symmetrical.
See, for example, S. J. Gould, ‘Biological Potential vs Biological Determinism’, Natural History Magazine (May 1976)
S. J. Gould, op. cit. ‘Sociobiology: The Art of Storytelling’, (May 1976)
P. Thagard, ‘Critical Notice of Michael Ruse, Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense?’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1981), 751–759.
See the references in note 4 for examples.
P. Suppes, Introduction to Logic, Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1957
P. Suppes, ‘What is a Scientific Theory?’ in S. Morgenbesser (ed.), Philosophy of Science Today, Basic Books, New York, 1967, pp. 55–67.
B. C. van Fraassen, ‘On the Extension of Beth’s Semantics of Physical Theories’, Philosophy of Science 37 (1970), 325–339
B. C. van Fraassen, ‘A Formal Approach to the Philosophy of Science’, in R. E. Colodney (ed.), Paradigms and Paradoxes, University of Pittsburg Press, Pittsburg, 1974, pp. 303–366
B. C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980.
F. Suppe, The Meaning and Use of Models in Mathematics and the Exact Sciences: A Study in the Structure of Exact Scientific Theories, University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, 1967 (Ph.D. Dissertation)
F. Suppe, ‘What’s Wrong with the Received View on the Structure of Scientific Theories?’, Philosophy of Science 39 (1982), 1–19
F. Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories, 2nd edn., University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1977
F. Suppe, ‘Theoretical Laws’, in M. Przelecki, K. Szaniawski, and R. Wojcicki (eds.), Formal Methods in the Methodology of Empirical Science, Ossolineum, Wroclaw, 1976, pp. 247–267.
J. Sneed, The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1971.
W. Stegmuller, The Structure and Dynamics of Theories Springer, New York, 1976
W. Stegmuller, The Structuralist View of Theories Springer, Berlin, 1976.
J. Beatty, ‘Optimal-Design Models and the Strategy of Model Building Evolutionary Biology’, Philosophy of Science 47 (1980), 532–561
J. Beatty, ‘What’s Wrong with the Received View of Evolutionary Theory?’ in P. D. Asquith and R. N. Giere (eds.), PSA 1980 vol. 2, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, 1981, pp. 397–426.
E. A. Lloyd, ‘A Semantic Approach to the Structure of Population Genetics’, Philosophy of Science 51 (1984), 242–264.
P. Thompson, ‘The Structure of Evolutionary Theory: A Semantic Approach’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 14 (1983), 215–229.
Suppe has also introduced the concept of a law of quasi-succession op. cit. ‘Theoretical Laws’.
For a more detailed account of the nature of physical systems on a state space approach see, op. cit., ‘What’s Wrong with the Received View of Scientific Theories?’; op. cit., ‘The Structure of Evolutionary Theory: A Semantic Approach’; or op. cit., ‘On the Extension of Beth’s Semantics of Physical Theories’.
H. Putnam, ‘What Theories Are Not’, in E. Nagel, P. Suppes and A. Tarski (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Stanford University Press, Standford, 1962, pp. 240–251.
Almost all of the previously cited articles which deal with the structure of theories discuss one or more of these differences. The best general account is found in op. cit., The Structure of Scientific Theories.
John Worrall (J. Worrall, ‘Review Article: An Unreal Image’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (1984), 65–80.)
K. F. Schaffner, ‘Correspondence Rules’, Philosophy of Science 36 (1969), 280–290.
P. Suppes, ‘Models of Data’, in E. Nagel, P. Suppes and A. Tarski (eds.), Logic Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1962, pp. 252–261
P. Suppes, op. cit., ‘What is a Scientific Theory?’, in E. Nagel, P. Suppes and A. Tarski (eds.), Logic Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1962, pp. 252–261
Suppe (F. Suppe, ‘Theories and Phenomena’, in W. Leinfellner and E. Kohler (eds.), Developments in the Methodology of Social Science, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974, pp. 45–91.)
See, for example, M. D. Sahlins, The Use and Abuse of Biology, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1976
the articles in A. Montagu (ed.), Sociobiology Examined, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980
A. L. Caplan, The Sociobiology Debate, Harper & Row, New York, 1978.
Many of these methodological objections can be found in Lewontin (op. cit., ‘Sociobiology: A Caricature of Darwinism’), Gould (op. cit., ‘Sociobiology: The Art of Storytelling’) and Burian (op. cit., ‘A Methodological Critique of Sociobiology’). Some examples are: (1) sociobiological theory provides a totally inadequate account of the phenomena to be explained; (2) the genetic and phenotypic variation required by the evolutionary explanations of sociobiologists is simply postulated as needed and any current lack of variation explained away by reference to the variation reducing character of the evolutionary process; (3) a genetic basis for phenomena being explained is assumed and any evidence that might suggest non-genetic transmission (as for example, the incredible short time span — in evolutionary/genetic terms — during which cultural change takes place) is rendered impotent by the postulation of ad hoc mechanisms (for example, the multiplier effect), which makes sociobiology immune to evidence and little more than fascinating storytelling; (4) the genome is incredibly more complex than sociobiological theory makes it out to be and the mapping of a genotype onto a phenotype or vice versa is so complex that sociobiological explanations can only be seen as trivializations which depend for credibility on simplistic and, where necessary to avoid negative evidence, ad hoc laws and principles.
See, op. cit., ‘A Methodological Critique of Sociobiology’, op. cit., ‘Sociobiology: The Art of Storytelling’, and op. cit., ‘Sociobiology: A Caricature of Darwinism’.
Consider, for example, Gould’s claim, “Most of Sociobiology wins from me the same high praise almost universally accorded to it. For a lucid account of evolutionary principles and an indefatigably thorough discussion of social behavior among all groups of animals, Sociobiology will be the primary document for years to come. But Wilson’s last chapter, ‘From Sociobiology to Sociology,’ leaves me very unhappy indeed. After twenty-six chapters of careful documentation for the non-human animals, Wilson concludes with an extended speculation on the genetic basis of supposedly universal patterns of human behavior” (op. cit., ‘Biological Potential vs. Biological Determinism’, p. 344).
For example, it is not clear that there is a phenomenon to be explained. Unless all (or, at least most) homosexuals have exclusively homosexual encounters, there is no phenomenon of persistence of an apparently deleterious behavior to be explained sociobiologically. If even 25% of dispositional homosexuals engaged in heterosexual activity frequently enough to leave offspring there would be no mystery about the persistence of the behavior, even granting its genetic basis. Hence, given that there is no clear evidence on this matter, sociobiologists cannot be sure that an evolutionary explanation is necessary or appropriate. In addition, there are good reasons for believing that there are considerable social influences on homosexual behavior since, as Lewontin has pointed out, there is known to be an “immense variation in the frequency of homosexual and heterosexual behavior in history and between social classes” (op. cit., ‘Sociobiology: A Caricature of Darwinism’, p. 28).
See D. S. Saunders, An Introduction to Biological Rhythms, Blackie, Glasgow, 1977
M. C. Moore-Ede et al., The Clocks that Time Us: Physiology of the Circadian Timing System, Harvard, Cambridge, 1982.
Op. cit., Sobiobiology: The New Synthesis, p. 251.
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Thompson, P. (1985). Sociobiological Explanation and the Testability of Sociobiological Theory. In: Fetzer, J.H. (eds) Sociobiology and Epistemology. Synthese Library, vol 180. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5370-3_10
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