Abstract
In this paper we analyze allocation problems where an efficient rule can be implemented in dominant strategies with balanced transfers. We first prove an impossibility result in the homogenous goods case when preferences over these goods are allowed to be sufficiently diverse.We then consider a package assignment problem where the planner can bundle or package various units of the homogenous goods and wishes to allocate the packages efficiently. We characterize the package schemes for which an efficient rule in the associated package assignment problem can be implemented in dominant strategies with balanced transfers.
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Mitra, M., Sen, A. (2010). Dominant Strategy Implementation in Multi-unit Allocation Problems. In: Basu, B., Chakravarty, S.R., Chakrabarti, B.K., Gangopadhyay, K. (eds) Econophysics and Economics of Games, Social Choices and Quantitative Techniques. New Economic Windows. Springer, Milano. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-1501-2_31
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-1501-2_31
Publisher Name: Springer, Milano
Print ISBN: 978-88-470-1500-5
Online ISBN: 978-88-470-1501-2
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