Dominant Strategy Implementation in Multi-unit Allocation Problems

  • Manipushpak Mitra
  • Arunava Sen
Part of the New Economic Windows book series (NEW)


In this paper we analyze allocation problems where an efficient rule can be implemented in dominant strategies with balanced transfers. We first prove an impossibility result in the homogenous goods case when preferences over these goods are allowed to be sufficiently diverse.We then consider a package assignment problem where the planner can bundle or package various units of the homogenous goods and wishes to allocate the packages efficiently. We characterize the package schemes for which an efficient rule in the associated package assignment problem can be implemented in dominant strategies with balanced transfers.


Allocation Problem Dominant Strategy Impossibility Result Impossibility Theorem Type Vector 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Clarke, E.H., 1971. Multi-part pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11, 17–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Green, J., Laffont, J.J., 1979. Incentives in Public Decision Making. North Holland Publication, AmsterdamGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Groves, T., 1973. Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41, 617–631CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Groves, T., Ledyard, J.O., 1977. Some limitations of demand revealing processes. Public Choice 29, 107–124CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Groves, T., Loeb, M., 1975. Incentives and public inputs. Journal of Public Economics 4, 211–226CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Holmström, B., 1979. Groves schemes on restricted domains. Econometrica 47, 1137–1144CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Hurwicz L. 1975. On the existence of allocative systems whose manipulative Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal. Mimeo, University of MinnesotaGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Hurwicz, L., Walker, M., 1990. On the generic non-optimality of dominant strategy allocation mechanisms: A general theorem that includes pure exchange economies. Econometrica 58, 683–704CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Liu, L., Tian, G., 1999. A characterization of the existence of optimal dominant strategy mechanisms. Review of Economic Design 4, 205–218CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Mitra, M., 2001.Mechanism Design in Queueing Problems. Economic Theory 17(2), 277–305CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Mitra, M., 2002. Achieving the First Best in Sequencing Problems. Review of Economic Design 7(1), 75–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Mitra, M., Sen, A. 2008. Efficient Allocation of Heterogeneous Commodities with Balanced Transfers, mimeo Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Suijs, J., 1996. On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making. Economic Design 2, 193–209CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    Tian, G., 1996. On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms. Economics Letters 53, 17–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    Vickrey, W., 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance 16, 8–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 16.
    Walker, M., 1980. On the non-existence of dominant strategy mechanisms for making optimal public decisions. Econometrica 48, 1521–1540CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Italia 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Manipushpak Mitra
    • 1
  • Arunava Sen
    • 2
  1. 1.Economic Research UnitIndian Statistical InstituteKolkataIndia
  2. 2.Planning UnitIndian Statistical InstituteNew DelhiIndia

Personalised recommendations