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Unternehmenskooperationen und die Rolle von Verträgen

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Als Grundlage für die weitere Analyse wird das Untersuchungsthema zunächst in den Kontext des Managements von Unternehmenskooperationen eingeordnet (2.1). Im Anschluss erfolgt eine Einführung in die für die Vertragsgestaltung zentrale Transaktionskostentheorie (2.2), bevor der Stand der empirischen Forschung zur Rolle von Verträgen in Unternehmenskooperationen aufgezeigt wird (2.3). Aufbauend auf diesen Ergebnissen werden erste Hypothesen zu den transaktionsspezifischen Determinanten vertraglicher Regelungen abgeleitet (2.4). 34 Vgl. Das/Teng (1998, S. 21 f.) und Mellewigt (2003, S. 8 ff.) für die Darstellung dieser Situation in der englischsprachigen respektive deutschsprachigen Kooperationsliteratur.

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(2008). Unternehmenskooperationen und die Rolle von Verträgen. In: Lernen in Vertragsbeziehungen. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-9984-9_2

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