Abstract
Despite his avowed anti-essentialism, Wittgenstein is an essentialist — about philosophy itself. “Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.” (P.I. 38) The philosopher takes a phrase from its home, working environment and idles with it. For example, he asks “Does the fact that when in the past I have touched things which are red hot, I have been burned, provide any reason, grounds, evidence for thinking that that will happen again?” Unable to see how what has happened in the past can provide any guide to what may happen in the future — without making an assumption that begs the question — he concludes that it cannot. Of course, his philosophical scepticism has no consequences for the philosopher’s behaviour, i.e., he is as reluctant as anyone else to touch fires, glowing hot-plates, etc. (— and if he were not, he would be mad.) So, the verbal expression of his “philosophical”, i.e., quite unreal doubt, is mere verbal play.
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Notes
Tractatus Logico-Philocophicus, 4.003, 6.5; The Blue and Brown Books, pp. 46, 58–9; On Certainty, 315, 625: “A doubt without an end is not even a doubt.”
Peter B. Medawar, Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought, Methuen, 1969. Author’s Preface, p.vii; also pp. 32, 45, 49.
Popper sometimes says that the assumption that future cases will resemble past cases is false or unempirical (Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, 4th. edition, revised, pp. 56–7; Objective Knowledge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, revised edition, p. 2). Well, of course there are areas of our lives where we realise this, e.g., regarding weather in Britain and how dice will fall, or what we may be dealt in card games. But in such areas again we tend to argue inductively i.e. that is how it has been and, therefore, will continue to be. Our `faith’ in inductive arguments in general is not shattered if and when they let us down, and would not be no matter what happened. It is faith but a curious one — it is not optional! And not only our beliefs, judgements, inferences and practices enshrine that faith, so does our very vocabulary.
Colin Radford, `Life, Flesh, and Animate Behaviour’, Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 4, No. 4, Autumn 1981.
Colin Radford, `Wittgenstein on Ethics’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol 33/34, 1989.
However respectful Hume is of belief in God, and scandalised by the unnaturalness of disbelief, he is openly contemptuous of the absurdities and savagery found in the Koran.
Philosophy 50, 1975.
`The symbolisms of Catholicism are wonderful beyond words. But any attempt to make it into a philosophical system is offensive. All religions are wonderful, even those of the most primitive tribes…’ (M.O’ C. Drury, `Conversations with Wittgenstein’, Recollections of Wittgenstein, ed. Rush Rhees, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 102)
How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?’, Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XLIX, 1975.
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Radford, C. (1990). Wittgenstein and Philosophy. In: Haller, R., Brandl, J. (eds) Wittgenstein — Eine Neubewertung / Wittgenstein — Towards a Re-Evaluation. Schriftenreihe der Wittgenstein-Gesellschaft, vol 19/1. J.F. Bergmann-Verlag, Munich. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-30086-2_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-30086-2_24
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