Abstract
This paper presents a noncooperative model of bargaining in characteristic function games and relates its outcomes to those of a cooperative model and a bargaining theory model. Despite the differences in the approach of these three models and the resulting differences in the nature of their solutions, all three models make similar predictions of bargaining outcomes.
I would like to thank the other members of the research group on Game Theory at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies at the University of Bielefeld, especially James Friedman and Reinhard Selten, for their comiments. I would also like to thank William Zame for his extensive comments on a earlier draft. I am wrateful to the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies at the University of Bielefeld for its support and hospitality and to Franz Weissing for his care and attention. This reasearch was supported, in part, by the National Science Foundation grant SES-8706631.
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References
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Bennett, E. (1991). Three Approaches to Bargaining in NTU Games. In: Selten, R. (eds) Game Equilibrium Models III. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4_5
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