Game Equilibrium Models III

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-IX

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2. Introduction to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”

   • Reinhard Selten

   Pages 1-2

3. Introduction to Volume III: “Strategic Bargaining”

   • Eric van Damme

   Pages 3-6

4. A Noncooperative Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem

   • Akira Okada

   Pages 7-33

5. A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long-Term Contracts

   • Akira Okada

   Pages 34-47

6. Three Approaches to Bargaining in NTU Games

   • Elaine Bennett

   Pages 48-69

7. Folk Theorems for the Proposal-Making Model

   • Elaine Bennett

   Pages 70-79

8. A Noncooperative Model of Bargaining in Simple Spatial Games

   • James D. Laing

   Pages 80-117

9. Demand Commitment Bargaining: - The Case Of Apex Games -

   • Elaine Bennett, Eric van Damme

   Pages 118-140

10. Prominence, Competition, Learning, and the Generation of Offers in Computer-Aided Experimental Spatial Games

    • Wulf Albers, James D. Laing

    Pages 141-185

11. Original or Fake — A Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information

    • Reinhard Selten, Werner Güth

    Pages 186-229

12. Wage Bargaining as a Strategic Game

    • Hans Haller

    Pages 230-241

13. A Game Equilibrium Model of Thin Markets

    • Reinhard Selten, Myrna H. Wooders

    Pages 242-282

14. Back Matter

    Pages 283-284

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The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored.

• Evolution
• Spieltheorie
• Wirtschaftstheorie
• economics
• equilibrium
• evolutionary processes
• evolutionäre Prozesse
• game theory
• incomplete information
• modeling
• nicht-kooperative Spieltheorie
• non-cooperative game theory

• Institut für Gesellschaft- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Bonn, Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung I, Bonn 1, Germany

  Reinhard Selten

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