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Von mikro- zu makroprudenzieller Regulierung

Eine Diskursanalyse zum Wandel von Regulierungskonzepten
Chapter

Zusammenfassung

Seit dem Ausbruch der Finanzkrise hat das makroprudenzielle politische Paradigma zunehmend an Einfluss gewonnen (Bank of England 2009; Bernanke 2011). Vor der globalen Finanzkrise 2007–2009 war die Arbeit der Aufsichtsbehörden in den Industrieländern einem mikroprudenziellen Paradigma gefolgt. Diesem Paradigma zufolge ist die Aufgabe der Bankenregulierung das Risikomanagement einzelner Banken (Borio 2009).

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Frankfurt am MainDeutschland

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