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Rational Choice

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Theorien der Internationalen Politischen Ökonomie

Part of the book series: Globale Politische Ökonomie ((GPÖ))

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Zusammenfassung

Im Zentrum des Rational-Choice-Ansatzes der Internationalen Politischen Ökonomie (IPÖ) stehen zwei Fragestellungen: Wann und weshalb öffnen sich Staaten für globale Marktintegration? Und wie beeinflusst globale Marktintegration die Präferenzordnung von Individuen, Firmen, Sektoren und Regierungen? Die zentrale Grundannahme der Rational-Choice-IPÖ ist dabei die Existenz eines Verteilungskonflikts zwischen Gewinnern und Verlierern der Integration.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    ‚Individuum‘/ Der Begriff Individuum/ ist breit konzipiert. Es kann sich um Personen, Firmen, Sektoren, Regierungen etc. handeln.

  2. 2.

    Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Forschungsprogramm des Rational Choice findet sich in Green/Shapiro (1994). Zur Diskussion der Stärken von Rational Choice vgl. Dür (2012).

  3. 3.

    Die Spieltheorie modelliert Situationen interdependenter strategischer Entscheidungen. Das Ergebnis individueller Handlungen (‚Auszahlungen‘ einer Handlungsstrategie) hängt dabei von den Handlungen weiterer beteiligter Individuen ab. Ziel der Spieltheorie ist somit die Analyse rationaler Strategien von Akteuren unter bestimmten Interaktionsbedingungen (McCarty/ Meirowitz 2007).

  4. 4.

    Die Vetospielertheorie analysiert den Einfluss von Vetospielern im politischen Entscheidungsprozess. Vetospieler sind dabei politische Akteure, denen formelle oder informelle institutionelle Vetomacht zukommt (Tsebelis 2002).

  5. 5.

    Handelsoffenheit bemisst sich nicht nur an der Höhe von Zöllen. Nicht-tarifäre Handelshemmnisse sind oft bedeutend und schwer zu quantifizieren. Sachs/Warner (1995) haben einen ersten Versuch unternommen, Handelsoffenheit mit einem Dummy-Indikator zu messen. Martin (2004) hat einen komplexeren Indikator für Entwicklungsländer entwickelt. In zahlreichen Studien wird allerdings der Handelsquotient (der Anteil der Importe und Exporte am BSP) als näherungsweise Variable für die Handelsoffenheit eines Landes verwendet.

  6. 6.

    Zur Messung von Kapitalverkehrsoffenheit hat die Literatur zwei Ansätze entwickelt / weist die Literatur zwei Ansätze aus – regulative sowie Verhaltensindikatoren. Eine Diskussion unterschiedlicher Indikatoren bieten Quinn et al. (2011). Basierend auf den Annual Reports on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions des Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) haben Bodenstein et al. (2003) einen Offenheitsindikator für die Transformationsländer und Martin (2005) für Entwicklungsländer vorgeschlagen.

  7. 7.

    Devereux et al. (2008) und Genschel (2002) sind allerdings der Auffassung, dass eine Konvergenz auf geringe Regulierungsniveaus erfolgt.

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Authors
  1. Thilo Bodenstein
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Universität Kassel, Kassel, Deutschland

    Joscha Wullweber

  2. Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Münster, Deutschland

    Antonia Graf

  3. Universität Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Deutschland

    Maria Behrens

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Bodenstein, T. (2014). Rational Choice. In: Wullweber, J., Graf, A., Behrens, M. (eds) Theorien der Internationalen Politischen Ökonomie. Globale Politische Ökonomie. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-02527-4_4

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