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Experimentelle Methoden

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Handbuch Policy-Forschung

Zusammenfassung

Die experimentelle Methode in der Policy-Forschung beruht auf den Prinzipien der Isolation des zentralen Zusammenhangs von Drittvariablen und der Identifikation durch systematische Variation des Untersuchungsdesign. Ihr Vorteil liegt vor allem in der Gültigkeit des Rückschluss von Beobachtung auf kausale Faktoren (interne Validität), während ein Ansatzpunkt für Bedenken in der Generalisierbarkeit der Ergebnisse liegt (externe Validität). Die experimentelle Methode steht damit vor einem Zielkonflikt zwischen Realitätsnähe und dem Grad der Kontrolle, der je nach Forschungsinteresse entlang verschiedener Experimenttypen – Labor-, Feld-, Umfrage- und natürliches Experiment – unterschiedlich gelöst wird. Der Schwerpunkt von für die Policy-Forschung relevanten Experimenten liegt auf der Prüfung von Theorien zu kollektiven Handlungssituationen, Verhandlungen, Gremienentscheidungen und deliberativen Verfahren. In einer politikberatenden Rolle können Experimente Rückschlüsse auf die Auswirkungen und Implikationen von Politikmaßnahmen geben. An Hand von Beispielen zum Design von Märkten und Auktionen, der Umweltpolitik, der Gesundheitspolitik und der Sozialpolitik werden für die Policy-Forschung relevante Experimente vorgestellt.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Wirtschaftssoziologie, Universität Wien, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, Wien, 1090, Österreich

    Georg Kanitsar & Dr. Bernhard Kittel

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  1. Georg Kanitsar
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  2. Dr. Bernhard Kittel
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Correspondence to Georg Kanitsar .

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  1. Kaiserslautern, Germany

    Georg Wenzelburger

  2. Heidelberg, Germany

    Reimut Zohlnhöfer

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Kanitsar, G., Kittel, B. (2015). Experimentelle Methoden. In: Wenzelburger, G., Zohlnhöfer, R. (eds) Handbuch Policy-Forschung. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-01968-6_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-01968-6_15

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