Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Informationen und Signale

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Handbuch Modellbildung und Simulation in den Sozialwissenschaften

  • 8481 Accesses

Zusammenfassung

Die Analyse strategischer Interaktionen zwischen zwei oder mehreren Spielern erfordert eine detaillierte Beschreibung der zu untersuchenden Situation. Dabei sind Annahmen über die Informationsstruktur der Situation wegen ihres Einflusses auf den Spielausgang von zentralem Interesse. Dieser Handbuchbeitrag bespricht, unter der Annahme rationaler Akteure, die Bedingungen und Konsequenzen unterschiedlicher Kategorisierungen von Information und die entsprechenden Spiele der nichtkooperativen Spieltheorie. Im Fokus steht dabei die Unterscheidung in Situationen mit symmetrischer und asymmetrischer Information. Eine wichtige Klasse von Spielen mit asymmetrischer Information sind Signalspiele, da sie empirische Situationen sehr treffend charakterisieren. Nach einer Einleitung in die Thematik diskutiert der Handbuchartikel die Annahmen zur Rationalität der Spieler, gefolgt von einer ausführlichen Diskussion verschiedener Informationsstrukturen und ihre typischen Spiele. Ein Abschnitt zu Signalspielen soll den kurzen Überblick zu Informationen und Signale abschließen.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 89.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Literaturverzeichnis

  • Akerlof, G. A. (1970) „The Market for, Lemons‘: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.“ Quarterly Journal of Economics 84: 488–500.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ansoombe, F. J. und R. J. AüMANN (1963), ,A Definition of Subjective Probability.“ The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 34: 199–205.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, G. S. (1964) Human Capital. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Binmore, K. (2007) Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bird, R. B. und E. a. Smith (2005) „Signaling Theory, Strategic Interaction, and Symbolic Capital.“ Current Anthropology 46: 221–248.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braun, N. und T. Gautsohi (2011) Rational-Choice-Theorie. Weinheim/München: Ju- venta Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chew, M. S.-Y. (2001) Rational Rituals: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coleman, J. S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dasgupta, P. (1988) „Trust as a Commodity.“ S. 49–72 in: D. Gambetta (Hg.) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Debreu, G. (1959) Theory of Value. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Diekmann, a. (2009) Spieltheorie: Einführung, Beispiele, Experimente. Reinbek: Rowohlt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Engers, M. (1987). „Signalling with Many Signals.“ Econometrica 55: 633–674.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, M. (1953) „The Methodology of Positive Economics.“ S. 3–43 in: M. Friedman (Hg.) Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fudenberg, D. und D. Levine (1998) The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fudenberg, D. und J. Tirole (1991) Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gintis, H. (2009) The Bounds of Reason. Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harsanyi, J. C. (1967) „Games with Incomplete Information Played by, Bayesian‘ Players, I: The Basic Model.“ Management Science 14: 159–182.

    Google Scholar 

  • HARSANYI, J. C. (1968a) „Games with Incomplete Information Played by, Bayesian‘ Players, II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points.“ Management Science 14: 320–334.

    Google Scholar 

  • HARSANYI, J. C. (1968b) „Games with Incomplete Information Played by, Bayesian‘ Players, III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game.“ Management Science 14: 486–502.

    Google Scholar 

  • HARSANYI, J. C. (1977) Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • HEDSTRÖM, P. (2005) Dissecting the Social. On the Principles of Analytical Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Holler, M. J. UND G. Illing (2006) Einführung in die Spieltheorie. 6. Auflage Berlin: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kreps, D. M. (1990a) A Course in Microeconomic Theory. New York: Harvester Wheats- heaf.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kreps, D. M. (1990b) „Corporate Culture and Economic Theory.“ S. 90–143 in: J. E. Alt UND K. A. Shepsle (Hg.) Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, H. W. (1953) „Extensive Games and the Problem of Information.“ S. 193–216 in: H. W. Kuhn (Hg.) Contributions to the Theory of Games, II. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laffont, J.-J. UND D. Martimort (2002) The Theory of Incentives. The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macy, M. W. (1989) „Walking Out of Social Traps. A Stochastic Learning Model for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.“ Rationality and Society 1: 197–219.

    Google Scholar 

  • McAdams, R. H. (2001) „Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology.“ Yale Law Journal 110: 625–689.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mas-Colell, a., M. D. Whinston UND J. R. Green (1995) Microeconomic Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mirrlees, J. (1971) „An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation.“ Review of Economic Studies 38: 175–208.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mueller, D. C. (1992) „On the Foundations of Social Science Research.“ Analyse und Kritik 14: 195–220.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nash, J. F. (1950) „Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games.“ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 36: 48–49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nash, J. F. (1951) „Non-Cooperative Games.“ Annals of Mathematics 54: 286–295.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nelissen R. M. A. UND M. H. C. Meijers (2011) „Social Benefits of Luxury Brands as Costly Signals of Wealth and Status.“ Evolution and Human Behavior 32: 343–355.

    Google Scholar 

  • Osborne, M. J. (2004) An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Osborne, M. J. UND a. Rubinstein (1990) Bargaining and Markets. San Diego: Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1995 [1967]) „Das Rationalitätsprinzip.“ S. 350–359 in: D. Miller (Hg.) Karl R. Popper Lesebuch. Tubingen: Mohr.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner, E. a. (2000) Law and Social Norms. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • RASMUSEN, E. (2007) Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. 4. Auflage Malden, MA: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Riley, J. G. (2001) „Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling.“ Journal of Economic Literature 39: 432–478.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roska, J. und M. Velez (2009) „When Studying Schooling is not Enough: Incorporating Employment in Models of Educational Transitions.“ Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 28: 5–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothschild, M. und J. E. Stiglitz (1976) „Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics on Imperfect Information.“ Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 629–649.

    Google Scholar 

  • Savage, L. J. (1954) The Foundations of Statistics. New York: John Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon, H. A. (1990) „Bounded Rationality.“ S. 15–18 in: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate und P. Newman (Hg.) The New Palgrave: Utility and Probability. New York: W.W. Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Skyrms, B. (2005) Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spence, A. M. (1973) „Job Market Signaling.“ Quarterly Journal of Economics 87: 355379.”

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. E. (1975) „The Theory of ‘Screening’, Education, and the Distribution of Income.“ American Economic Review 65: 283–300.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thaler, R. H. und C. R. Sunstein (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vanberg, V. (1994) Rules and Choice in Economics. New York: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Vickery W. (1961) „Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders.“ Journal of Finance 16: 8–37.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • VON Randow, G. (2004) Das Ziegenproblem: Denken in Wahrscheinlichkeiten. 7. Auflage Reinbek: Rowohlt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O. E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, A. (1975) „Mate Selection-A Selection for a Handicap.“ Journal of Theoretical Biology 53: 205-2”14.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universität Mannheim, Mannheim, Deutschland

    Prof. Dr. Thomas Gautschi

Authors
  1. Prof. Dr. Thomas Gautschi
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Thomas Gautschi .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Ludwig Maximilians-Universität München, Germany

    Norman Braun

  2. Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany

    Nicole J. Saam

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Gautschi, T. (2015). Informationen und Signale. In: Braun, N., Saam, N. (eds) Handbuch Modellbildung und Simulation in den Sozialwissenschaften. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-01164-2_24

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-01164-2_24

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer VS, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-658-01163-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-658-01164-2

  • eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Science (German Language)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation