Abstract
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is unique among international organizations in its use of on-site inspections to verify that states are in compliance with the terms of a negotiated agreement. These inspections are applied in 52 countries at nearly 500 facilities to assure that uses of nuclear materials and facilities are limited to peaceful purposes. The legal basis for the inspections is agreements between the IAEA and the state, concluded in the framework of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, for full scope safeguards on all nuclear materials. In addition, other more limited agreements for safeguards on a portion of a state’s nuclear material are also concluded with states not party to the treaty. In either case, the role of the IAEA is to verify compliance with the terms of these agreements by auditing facility operating records and reports submitted to the IAEA by the state, by independent measurement of nuclear materials by IAEA inspectors, and by emplacement of surveillance devices to monitor facility operations in the inspector’s absence.
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© 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Avenhaus, R., Markin, J.T. (1986). International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards. In: Avenhaus, R., Huber, R.K., Kettelle, J.D. (eds) Modelling and Analysis in Arms Control. NATO ASI Series, vol 26. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82943-7_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82943-7_29
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