Abstract
Game theoretical studies of international military conflicts usually assume simple game structures, such as 2 × 2 - bimatrix games (cf. Brams, Davis and Straffin 1979, Brams and Davis 1984, Brams and Kilgour 1985a–d, and Brams 1985 for an excellent overview and introduction to the game theoretic approach). Such simple models inevitably neglect institutional aspects of real-life international armed conflicts. They still deserve attention, since they help to explain why no significant disarmament has occurred thus far.
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© 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Güth, W. (1986). Deterrence and Incomplete Information the Game Theory Approach. In: Avenhaus, R., Huber, R.K., Kettelle, J.D. (eds) Modelling and Analysis in Arms Control. NATO ASI Series, vol 26. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82943-7_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82943-7_15
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