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A Demand-Based Allocation Mechanism for Virtual Machine

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Artificial Intelligence and Robotics

Part of the book series: Studies in Computational Intelligence ((SCI,volume 752))

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Abstract

In the Iaas service mode for cloud computing, cloud providers allocate resources in the form of Virtual Machines (VM) to cloud users via auction mechanism. The existing auction mechanism lacks self-adapting adjustment to market changes. An improved online auction mechanism by taking into account the changes in demand during peak and trough period in the allocation scheme has been proposed, so that the auctioneer can make decisions reasonably, improve resource utilization rate, and bring higher profits. Firstly, we present an auction framework for VM allocation based on multi-time period, then prove the mechanism satisfies individual rationality and incentive compatibility. Finally, we try to use the real workload file to perform simulation experiments to verify the effectiveness of the improved online mechanism.

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Acknowledgements

Project supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (Grant No.61170201, No.61070133, No.61472344); Six-talent peaks project in Jiangsu Province (Grant No.2011-DZXX-032). Innovation Foundation for graduate students of Jiangsu Province (Grant No.CXLX12 0916), Jiangsu Science and Technology Project No. BY2015061-06BY2015061-08, Yangzhou Science and Technology Project No. SXT20140048, SXT20150014, SXT201510013, Natural Science Foundation of the Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions (Grant No.14KJB520041), Innovation Program for graduate students of Jiangsu Province (Grant No.SJZZ16_0261).

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Correspondence to Junwu Zhu .

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Teng, L., Geng, H., Yang, Z., Zhu, J. (2018). A Demand-Based Allocation Mechanism for Virtual Machine. In: Lu, H., Xu, X. (eds) Artificial Intelligence and Robotics. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 752. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69877-9_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69877-9_7

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-69876-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-69877-9

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