Abstract
After Chaum introduced the concept of anonymous credential systems, a number of similar systems have been proposed; however, these systems use zero-knowledge protocols to authenticate users resulting in inefficient authentication in the possession of credential proving stage. In order to overcome this drawback of anonymous credential systems, we use partially blind signatures and chameleon hash functions to propose a signature scheme such that both the prover and the verifier achieve efficient authentication. In addition to giving a computational cost comparison table to show that the proposed signature scheme achieves more efficient possession proving than others, we provide concrete security proofs under the random oracle model to demonstrate that the proposed scheme satisfies the properties of anonymous credentials.
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Acknowledgements
This work was partially supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Taiwan under grants MOST 105-2923-E-110-001-MY3 and MOST 105-2221-E-110-053-MY2.
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Wu, CN., Fan, CI., Huang, JJ., Tseng, YF., Kikuchi, H. (2018). An Efficient Signature Scheme for Anonymous Credentials. In: Lee, R. (eds) Applied Computing & Information Technology. ACIT 2017. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 727. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64051-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64051-8_4
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