Abstract
Recent contributions to the philosophical literature on scientific modeling have tended to follow one of two approaches, on the one hand addressing conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological questions about models, or, on the other hand, emphasizing the cognitive aspects of modeling and accordingly focusing on model-based reasoning. In this paper I explore the relationship between these two approaches through a case study of model-based research on the behavior of infant rats, particularly thigmotaxis (movement based on tactile sensation) and temperature regulation in groups. A common assumption in the philosophical literature is that models represent the target phenomena they simulate. In the modeling project under investigation, however, this assumption was not part of the model-based reasoning process, arising only in a theoretical article as, I suggest, a post hoc rhetorical device. I argue that the otherwise nonexistent concern with the model-target relationship as being representational results from a kind of objectification often at play in philosophical analysis, one that can be avoided if an alternative form of objectification is adopted instead.
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Notes
- 1.
MATLAB and Simulink are trademarks of the Mathworks Company, Needham, MA.
- 2.
Knuuttila (2011) calls this assumption the “representational view of models” and she explores an alternative approach, although it is unclear that her account succeeds in providing a real alternative since it maintains some role for representations in modeling.
- 3.
I think this insight can be applied more broadly to motivate an anti-representationalist view of scientific modeling, but this is a topic I pursue in more detail elsewhere.
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de Oliveira, G.S. (2016). Approaches to Scientific Modeling, and the (Non)Issue of Representation: A Case Study in Multi-model Research on Thigmotaxis and Group Thermoregulation. In: Magnani, L., Casadio, C. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_5
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