Abstract
Hintikka (1997, 1998) argues that abduction is ignorance-preserving in the sense that the hypothesis that abduction delivers and which attempts to explain a set of phenomena is not, epistemologically speaking, on a firmer ground than the phenomena it purports to explain; knowledge is not enhanced until the hypothesis undergoes a further inductive process that will test it against empirical evidence. Hintikka, therefore, introduces a wedge between the abductive process properly speaking and the inductive process of hypothesis testing. Similarly, Minnameier (2004) argues that abduction differs from the inference to the best explanation (IBE) since the former describes the process of generation of theories, while the latter describes the, inductive, process of their evaluation. As Hintikka so Minnameier traces this view back to Peirce’s work on abduction. Recent work on abduction (Gabbay and Wood 2005) goes as far as to draw a distinction between abducting an hypothesis that is considered worth conjecturing and the decision either to use further this hypothesis to do some inferential work in the given domain of enquiry, or to test it experimentally. The latter step, when it takes place, is an inductive mode of inference that should be distinguished from the abductive inference that led to the hypothesis. In this paper, I argue that in real scientific practise both the distinction between a properly speaking abductive phase and an inductive phase of hypothesis testing and evaluation, and the distinction between testing an hypothesis that has been discovered in a preceding abduction and releasing or activating the same hypothesis for further inferential work in the domain of enquiry in which the ignorance problem arose in the first place are blurred because all these processes form an inextricable whole of theory development and elaboration and this defies and any attempt to analyze this intricate process into discrete well defined steps. Thus, my arguments reinforce Magnani’s (2014) view on abduction and its function in scientific practise.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
The G-W schema for abduction is as follows:
-
1.
T!α [setting of T as an epistemic target with respect to a proposition α],
-
2.
¬(R(K, T)) [fact], where R is the attainment relation with respect to T, and K is the knowledge base available to the agent,
-
3.
¬(R(K*, T)) [fact], where K* is an accessible successor of K in the sense that an agent could construct it in ways that serve to attain targets linked to K,
-
4.
H ∉ K [fact], where H is the proposed hypothesis,
-
5.
H ∉ K* [fact],
-
6.
¬R(H,T) [fact],
-
7.
¬R(K(H),T) [fact], where K(H) is the knowledge base with the addition of H, which may mean that K has to be somewhat revised,
-
8.
If H * R(K(H),T) [fact], where * is the subjunctive conditional relation,
-
9.
H meets further conditions S1,…, Sn [fact],
-
10.
Therefore, C(H) [sub-conclusion, 1–9].
-
11.
Therefore, Hc [conclusion, 1–10].
-
1.
- 2.
Newton’s four rules of reasoning read (Newton 1729, 398–400):
-
Rule 1:
We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.
-
Rule 2:
Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes.
-
Rule 3:
The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification nor remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.
-
Rule 4:
In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions.
The first two rules refer to inductive inferences (the term ‘inductive inferences’ denotes any kind of ampliative inferences, that is, inferences the conclusions of which are not contained in the premises) pertaining to causes. I think that these inferences are instances of causal simplification (or, as they are sometimes called ‘analogical inferences’) that have one of the following forms:
- C1::
-
Effects E1, …, En are the same in systems S1, … Sk. Therefore (By Rule 2) these effects have the same causes in all these systems.
- C2::
-
The cause of effect E in system 1 is an X with properties P1, …, P n. The cause of the same or similar effect E in system 2 is an x with properties P1, …, Pn. Therefore (by Rules 1 and 2) the cause of the effect in system 1 is the same X as that which causes the effects in system 2.
- C3::
-
Effects E1, …, E n in system 1 are caused by C. Effects E1, … E n are also present in system 2. Therefore (by Rules 1 and 2) effects E1, …, E n are caused by C in system 2.
Rule 3 sanctions inferences from properties found to hold for all observed members of a class to the claim that these properties hold for any unobserved members of the class (or for all the members of this class). Furthermore, this Rule justifies inferences to unobserved members of a class and to the unobservable realm.
Rule 4, finally, discloses the method to be used in experimental philosophy In this philosophy propositions are ‘inductively’ inferred from the phenomena. Though the rule does not specify what kinds of propositions are inferred from the phenomena, Newton states that in natural philosophy we seek to establish the general properties of things and that the method is to be used in our inquiries after the properties of the things. Moreover, the causes of these properties are to be discovered by means of the same method.
-
Rule 1:
Abbreviations
- ADD:
-
It stands for “Additional Manuscript”, Cambridge University Library
- AT:
-
It stands for the edition of Descartes’ work by Adam and Tannery (Paris: Leopold Cerf 1897). The Latin numeral indicates the volume of this edition and the Arabic number (s) the page (s)
- CSM:
-
It stands for the translation of part of Descartes’ work in English in three volumes by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)
References
Bacon, F. (1990). Novum Organum (P. Urbach and J. Gibson, Trans.). Open Court: Chicago.
Cohen, I. B. (Ed.). (1958). Isaak Newton’s papers and letters on natural philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gabbay, D. M., & Woods, J. (2005). The reach of abduction. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Hall, A. R. (1993). All Was Light: An Introduction to Newton’s Opticks. Clarendon Press: Oxford.
Harman, G. (1965). Enumerative induction as inference to the best explanation. Journal of Philosophy, 68(18), 529–533.
Hintikka, J. (1997). The place of C.S Peirce in the history of logical theory. In J. Brunning & P. Forster (Eds.), The rule of reason. Toronto: Toronto University Press.
Hintikka, J. (1998). What is abduction? The fundamental problem of contemporary epistemology. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 34, 503–533.
Lipton, P. (2004). Inference to the best explanation (2nd ed.). London/New York: Routledge.
Magnani, L. (2014). Are heuristics knowledge-enhancing? Abduction, models, and fictions in science. In E. Ippoloti (Ed.), Heuristic reasoning, studies in applied philosophy, epistemology and rational ethics. Switzerland: Springer.
McGuire, J. E. (1970). Newton’s Principles of Philosophy: An Intended Preface for the 1704 Opticks. The British Journal for the History of Science, 5(18), 178–186.
Minnameier, G. (2004). Peirce-suit of truth—Why inference to the best explanation and abduction ought not to be confused. Erkenntnis, 60, 75–105.
Newton, I. (1729/1962). Principia. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Newton, I. (1730/1952). Opticks (4 ed.). New York: Dover.
Nickles, T. (1988). Reconstructing Science: Discovery and Experiment. In D. Batens & J. P. Van Bendegem (Eds.), Theory and Experiment: Recent Insights and New Perspectives on Their Relation (pp. 33–53). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Nickles, T. (1989). Justification and experiment. In D. Gooding, T. Pinch, & S. Schaffer (Eds.), The uses of experiment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Raftopoulos, A. (1999). Newton’s experimental proofs as eliminative reasoning. Erkenntnis, 50(1), 95–125.
Thayer, H. S. (Ed.). (1953). Newton’s philosophy of nature. New York: Hafner Press.
Woods, J. (2009). Ignorance, inference and proof: abductive logic meets the criminal law. In G. Tuzet & D. Canale (Eds.), The rules of inference: Inferentialism in law and philosophy (pp. 151–185). Heidelberg: Egea.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this paper
Cite this paper
Raftopoulos, A. (2016). Abduction, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Scientific Practise: The Case of Newton’s Optics. In: Magnani, L., Casadio, C. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-38982-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-38983-7
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)