Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Narrowed Down Utopia: Adjusting the WTO to a Changing Trade Environment

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
A Post-WTO International Legal Order

Abstract

The survival of the WTO will depend on its ability to adjust its obligations and institutional framework to a changing trade environment. As a result of intensifying economic interdependence, the information and communications technology revolution and significant changes in the socio-economic context within which trade takes place, trade flows will be increasingly affected by non-protectionist policies adopted within the border. In response, a sub-group of WTO Members are negotiating collective obligations for services domestic regulation, investment facilitation and electronic commerce. This paper unveils the inconsistencies between collective obligations and a rule making and enforcement process designed for obligations of a bilateral nature. It argues that to remain fit for purpose to secure an open and non-discriminatory rule-based multilateral trading system in years to come, the WTO must keep fighting trade protectionism through negotiations and litigation and, instead of expanding its rule-book with hard collective obligations, address the trade restrictive effects of non-protectionist policies by strengthening its deliberative function.

Reader in International Economic Law, Queen Mary University of London.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 149.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See WTO Report on G20 Trade Measures (Mid-May 2019 to Mid-October 2019). https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/report_trdev_21nov19_e.pdf.

  2. 2.

    Despite a protracted slowdown of world trade growth in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, trade still stands at around 28% of world GDP. That’s essentially double the 13.5% average share in 1947–1991, during the Cold War. See Stephen SR (2019) US, China and the myth of global decoupling. https://www.livemint.com/news/world/us-china-and-the-myth-of-global-decoupling-11577290013979.html.

  3. 3.

    The rise of international value chains, by which firms organize their supply chain across different countries, has shifted trade policy makers’ concerns from barriers to selling to barriers to making things. See Baldwin RE (2012) Global supply chains: Why they emerged, why they matter, and where they are going. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9103.

  4. 4.

    The distributional effects of trade, particularly its impact on jobs and income distribution are now subject to intense scrutiny. In addition, consumers are increasingly concerned about the impact of products and process of production methods on a wide range of issues such as the environment, food safety and animal welfare, to name but a few. See World Trade Report (2013) Factors shaping the future of world trade, p. 268. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_report13_e.pdf.

  5. 5.

    See below Sect. 3.

  6. 6.

    See below Sect. 2.

  7. 7.

    See below Sect. 3.4.

  8. 8.

    See below Sect. 4.2.

  9. 9.

    See Pauwelyn (2003a), pp. 907–951. The author traces the origin and evolution of the distinction through a number of sources of Public International Law including the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (28/05/51), the International Law Commission (ILC) Reports on the Law of Treaties by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the ILC Articles on State Responsibility (2001), in particular the differences between Article 42(a) and 48.1(a).

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Ibid.

  12. 12.

    Ibid.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., pp. 928–936.

  14. 14.

    Ibid., p. 940.

  15. 15.

    E.g. Articles I, II, III, XI GATT 1994.

  16. 16.

    E.g. Articles VI of GATS, Article 3 of SPS and 2.4 of TBT.

  17. 17.

    This of course, does not mean that the treaty confers the individual a mechanism to enforce such right. As it is well known, the legal standing to bring claims under the WTO dispute settlement system is limited to states only.

  18. 18.

    See Pauwelyn (2014) and Mattoo A, Mulabdic A, Ruta M (2017) Deep trade agreements as public goods. VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal, 11 October 2017. https://voxeu.org/article/trade-effects-deep-agreements.

  19. 19.

    Article II GATT.

  20. 20.

    Article VI.1 GATS.

  21. 21.

    Article X.3(b) GATT.

  22. 22.

    Communication from Australia et al—Elements for Discussion. (JOB/SERV/231/Rev.1, 13/06/16).

  23. 23.

    Draft Reference Paper on Services Domestic Regulation, Note by the Chairperson, 12 July 2019. Copy on hold.

  24. 24.

    Para. 1, Section II.

  25. 25.

    Para 7(d) and 7(e), Section II.

  26. 26.

    Joint Ministerial Statement on Investment Facilitation for Development, 13 December 2017 (WT/MIN(17)/59).

  27. 27.

    Ibid.

  28. 28.

    WTO Structured Discussions on Investment Facilitation for Development Working Document (INF/IFD/RD/39, 24 July19).

  29. 29.

    Joint Ministerial Statement on Investment Facilitation for Development, 5 November 2019 (WT/L/1072).

  30. 30.

    Ibid.

  31. 31.

    Ibid.

  32. 32.

    Ibid.

  33. 33.

    Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, WT/L/274. General Council, World Trade Organization, 30 September 1998.

  34. 34.

    Updating the Multilateral Rule Book on E-Commerce, ICTSD Policy Brief, March 2019, p. 2.

  35. 35.

    Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, 13 December 2017 WT/MIN(17)/60.

  36. 36.

    Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, 25 January 2019, WT/L/1056.

  37. 37.

    G20 (2019) Osaka Declaration on Digital Economy. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/osaka_declration_on_digital_economy_e.pdf.

  38. 38.

    See INF/ECOM/ in WTO Documents Online. https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S005.aspx.

  39. 39.

    See Acharya (2016); Hofmann et al. (2019), pp. 365–398.

  40. 40.

    Article 3.2 DSU.

  41. 41.

    Article XXIII.1 GATT 1994.

  42. 42.

    Article 3.8 DSU.

  43. 43.

    Article XXII.1 (b) and (c).

  44. 44.

    See Pauwelyn (2003b), p. 65.

  45. 45.

    Article 22.2 DSU.

  46. 46.

    See Pauwelyn (2003b), p. 77 citing the EC-Bananas case, where Ecuador obtained authorisation to suspend its obligations vis a vis the EC under the TRIPs agreement.

  47. 47.

    Ibid.

  48. 48.

    See, e.g. Articles 27.8, 28.20 and 29.10 USMCA.

  49. 49.

    See WTO Report on G20 Trade Measures (Mid-May 2019 to Mid-October 2019). https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/report_trdev_21nov19_e.pdf.

  50. 50.

    See above n2, n3 and n4.

  51. 51.

    Jackson et al. (1995), p. 378.

  52. 52.

    Low (2009), pp. 327–334.

  53. 53.

    For example, the USMCA includes an Environment Chapter whose objectives are: “to promote mutually supportive trade and environmental policies and practices; promote high levels of environmental protection and effective enforcement of environmental laws; and enhance the capacities of the Parties to address trade-related environmental issues, including through cooperation, in the furtherance of sustainable development.” (Article 24.2). The objective of promoting high levels of environmental protection per se goes beyond the objective of tackling the trade restrictive impact of environmental policies.

  54. 54.

    There is a trade-off between respecting differences in national preferences and exploiting the efficiency gains from regulatory convergence. See WTO (2013) World Trade Report 2013, above footnote 4, p. 281.

  55. 55.

    See International Law Commission (2006) Report of International Law Commission on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law.

  56. 56.

    See Lester (2011), pp. 209–278.

  57. 57.

    See Pascal Lamy’s speech on 1/10/10. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl173_e.htm. On the case for strengthening the WTO missing middle, see Evenett (2009), pp. 359–374.

  58. 58.

    See Bohnenberger (2019), pp. 30–31.

  59. 59.

    Finally, mechanisms should be put in place to provide targeted technical and financial assistance for WTO Members who struggle to attend and influence the debate within these committees.

  60. 60.

    See Chaisse and Matsushita (2013), pp. 9–36.

  61. 61.

    WTO Secretariat Background Note ‘Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking and Cooperation between the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank’ (WT/TF/COH/S/7 29 April 2003), para 74.

References

  • Acharya R (2016) Introduction – regional trade agreements: recent developments. In: Acharya R (ed) Regional trade agreements and the multilateral trading system. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Bohnenberger F (2019) Between law and politics: WTO regime management as everyday diplomatic practice. Paper presented at 8th PEPA/SIEL Conference, King’s College, London, 30–31 May 2019

    Google Scholar 

  • Chaisse J, Matsushita M (2013) Maintaining the WTO’s supremacy in the international trade order: a proposal to refine and revise the role of the trade policy review mechanism. J Int Econ Law 16(1):9–36

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evenett SJ (2009) Aid for trade and the “Missing Middle” of the World Trade Organization. Glob Gov 15(3):359–374

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hofmann C, Osnago A, Ruta M (2019) The content of preferential trade agreements. World Trade Rev 18(3):365–398

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jackson JH, Davey WJ, Sykes AO (1995) Legal problems of international economic relations, cases, materials and text, 3rd edn. West Group, St. Paul, p 378

    Google Scholar 

  • Lester S (2011) The role of the international trade regime in global governance. UCLA J Int Law Foreign Aff 16(2):209–278

    Google Scholar 

  • Low P (2009) Potential future functions of the world trade organization. Glob Gov 15(3):327–334

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pauwelyn J (2003a) A typology of multilateral treaty obligations: are WTO obligations bilateral or collective in nature? Eur J Int Law 14(5):907–951

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pauwelyn J (2003b) Conflict of norms in public international law. How WTO relates to other rules of international law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 65

    Google Scholar 

  • Pauwelyn J (2014) Taking the preferences out of preferential trade agreements: TTIP as a provider of public goods? In: Morin J-F, Novotná T, Ponjaert F, Telò M (eds) The politics of transatlantic trade negotiations: TTIP in a globalized world. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

The article has benefited from feedback provided by participants to the workshop “Paradise Lost or Found? The Post-WTO Int’l “Legal” Order, (Utopian & Dystopian Possibilities)” held at the Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London), 18–19 October 2019, Joost Pauwelyn and an anonymous reviewer. The usual caveats apply.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Queen Mary University of London, London, UK

    Gabriel Gari

Authors
  1. Gabriel Gari
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Gabriel Gari .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University at Buffalo School of Law, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY, USA

    Meredith Kolsky Lewis

  2. Faculty of Liberal Arts, Chuo Gakuin University, Chiba, Japan

    Junji Nakagawa

  3. Faculty of Law, University of Macau, Taipa, Macao

    Rostam J. Neuwirth

  4. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Colin B. Picker

  5. Jean Monnet Chair, Institute for International Law and European Law, Georg August University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany

    Peter-Tobias Stoll

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Gari, G. (2020). Narrowed Down Utopia: Adjusting the WTO to a Changing Trade Environment. In: Lewis, M.K., Nakagawa, J., Neuwirth, R.J., Picker, C.B., Stoll, PT. (eds) A Post-WTO International Legal Order. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45428-9_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45428-9_3

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-45427-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-45428-9

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation