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Part of the book series: Studies in Military and Strategic History ((SMSH))

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Abstract

The 1915 campaign demonstrated that the Entente needed more effective coordination of effort and resources for the successful prosecution of the war. It seemed that this need had been addressed at the allied military conference at Chantilly on 6 December 1915, where it was decided that in 1916 ‘England, France, Italy and Russia will undertake a simultaneous combined offensive with the maximum of troops possible on their respective fronts whenever they are in a position to undertake it, and where circumstances appear favourable’.1 Yet while laudable as an expression of collective intent, this agreement was still imprecise enough to allow wide scope for disagreement when it came to working out the practical details of the 1916 campaign. A definite date for the offensive was not fixed, although it was hoped that the allied armies would be ready to attack at the beginning of March 1916. In the meantime the war of attrition was to continue. Soon after the Chantilly conference it became clear that the Russian army would not be ready to attack before June, but Anglo-French preparations were still to be completed by March in case an offensive to relieve Russia was necessary.2

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Notes and References

  1. ‘General Staff Note on the Situation’, by Robertson (2 Dec. 1915), WO 158/18/53.

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  2. See K. Simpson, ‘The Reputation of Sir Douglas Haig’, in B.J. Bond (ed.), The First World War and British Military History (Oxford, 1991), pp. 141–62. The most valuable assessment of Haig’s career remains

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  3. J. Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier (London, 1963). Recent works which develop or challenge Terraine’s view include

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  4. T. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare (London, 1987);

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  5. G.J. De Groot, Douglas Haig, 1861–1928 (London, 1988);

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  6. D. Winter, Haig’s Command: A Reassessment (London, 1991).

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  7. Winter, op. cit., pp. 28–34.

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  8. Ibid., pp. 11–27;

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  9. Terraine, op. cit., pp. 51–5;

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  10. Travers, op. cit., pp. 101–4.

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  11. Terraine, op. cit., pp. 183–5.

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  12. Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, The Dover Patrol (2 vols, London, 1919), i 4.

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  13. Ibid., i 14–20 and 63.

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  14. Haig diary, ibid.; ‘Notes for C.G.S. on taking over more French line’, by Haig (21 Dec. 1915), Haig papers, file 104; ‘Operations on the Western Front, 1916, part II: The Working Out of the Details for the 1916 Campaign’, pp. 10–11, Haig papers, file 213a.

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  15. Haig diary, ibid.

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  16. ‘Some Thoughts on the Future’, memorandum by Haig(?) (14 Jan. 1916), Haig papers, file 104.

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  17. Haig diary (12 June 1916); ‘Précis of a conference between the Commander-in-Chief and the Vice-Admiral, Dover’ (12 June 1916), Haig papers, file 106; Bacon, The Dover Patrol, i 264–5.

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  18. Lt.-Col. J.H. Boraston (ed.), Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches (London, 1920), p. 20.

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© 1996 William James Philpott

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Philpott, W.J. (1996). The Ascendancy of French Strategy: The Somme Offensive. In: Anglo—French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24511-6_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24511-6_7

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-24513-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-24511-6

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