Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-x

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2. Deficiencies in Preparation: August 1914

   • William James Philpott

   Pages 1-14

3. Differences in the Field: Mons and the Marne, August–September 1914

   • William James Philpott

   Pages 15-30

4. The Failure of Coordination: The Siege of Antwerp and the First Battle of Ypres

   • William James Philpott

   Pages 31-50

5. Discordant Strategies: December 1914–January 1915

   • William James Philpott

   Pages 51-67

6. Politics and Grand Strategy

   • William James Philpott

   Pages 68-92

7. Relations in the Field

   • William James Philpott

   Pages 93-111

8. The Ascendancy of French Strategy: The Somme Offensive

   • William James Philpott

   Pages 112-128

9. The Northern Flank Strategy

   • William James Philpott

   Pages 129-149

10. The Coordination of Allied Strategy

    • William James Philpott

    Pages 150-160

11. Conclusion

    • William James Philpott

    Pages 161-165

12. Back Matter

    Pages 166-227

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This book is a study of Anglo-French relations and military policy making in the First World War, which considers the strategic policies and operational planning of the British and French armies in the joint campaign fought on the western front. It examines the influence of incompatible British and French strategic objectives, the role of the allies' military and political leaders and the institutional development of the military alliance, on the alliance relationship and military policy making.

• 5327
• First World War
• Front

• London Guildhall University, UK

  William James Philpott

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