Relations in the Field

Abstract

In the absence of effective coordinating machinery successful cooperation depended on good personal relations between the allied leaders. This was especially the case where two separate and in time equally important armies were fighting side by side on a common front. Although the British and French commanders-in-chief could usually present a united front to their governments on questions of grand strategy, harmony was less assured when it came to executing that strategy. While the French commander-in-chief had nominal authority to direct joint operations, cooperation and coordination proved difficult and occasionally impossible before unity of command was established under Foch in March 1918. GHQ and GQG were wont to disagree over operational strategy, the planning and execution of joint military operations, defensive priorities, and the distribution of the defensive line. Xenophobia, incompatible national interests, professional jealousies and inadequate mechanisms for coordination all contributed to a fluid and often tense command relationship. Knowledge of the working of the military alliance therefore aids understanding of the problems of joint operational planning.