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Abstract

For over four years the Anglo-French armies fought side by side against a common enemy. A victorious conclusion to their joint struggle allowed the inefficiency, tension and disagreements of close alliance to be magnanimously overlooked, and an unduly rosy picture of Anglo—French relations was subsequently painted by those whose had observed allied decision making at first hand.1 Moreover, a lack of detachment from the events under consideration means that many of the private papers, memoirs and commentaries of the participants have to be approached with caution,2 and it has been left to later generations to form a more objective view of allied military and political decision making3

Keywords

British Government Northern Flank Close Alliance Offensive Strategy Common Enemy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes and References

  1. 7.
    B.J. Bond, France and Belgium, 1939–40 (London, 1975), pp. 16–33 passim.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© William James Philpott 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • William James Philpott
    • 1
  1. 1.London Guildhall UniversityUK

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