Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Democracy and the state of exception:

The Italian experience

Demokratie und Ausnahmezustand

Der Fall Italien

  • Aufsatz
  • Published:
Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Necessitas non habet legem, sed ipsa sibi facit legem (Publilius Syrus, Sententiae)

Abstract

The Italian experience offers some interesting insights when dealing with the state of exception and emergency situations. The 1948 Constitution does not provide for any emergency section. Nevertheless, it provides for instruments to enact whenever a situation of necessity and urgency occurs. What is peculiar to the Italian experience is the misuse (or abuse) of the law decree, which has established a governmental legislation. A more recent practice has been to resort to emergency instruments even in situations that are not properly emergencies, but rather just difficult to handle, where the connection to the extraordinary character of the situation is lacking. This anomaly has been criticized by courts, thereby leading the Parliament to amend the legislation. Moreover, the present-day economic crisis has led to the twisting of the form of government (and of State) in situations of emergency with respect to the role of the President of the Republic and of the Constitutional Court.

Zusammenfassung

Der Fall Italien bietet einige interessante Einblicke in den aktuellen Stand der Ausnahme- und Notfallsituationen. Die Verfassung von 1948 sieht keine Regelung zum Ausnahmezustand vor. Nichtsdestoweniger ermöglicht sie Verfahren, die angewandt werden können, wann immer eine Krisensituation dies erfordert. Was den italienischen Fall im Kern ausmacht, ist der Missbrauch eines Gesetzesdekrets, mit dem eine Regierungsgesetzgebung ermöglicht wurde. Daran hat sich eine Praxis angeschlossen, die den Einsatz von Notfallinstrumenten sogar dann ermöglicht, wenn es sich nicht um Notfälle handelt und ein außergewöhnlicher Charakter fehlt. Diese Anomalie wurde von den Gerichten kritisiert, was das Parlament dazu veranlasste, die Gesetzgebung zu ändern. Die gegenwärtige Wirtschaftskrise hat jedoch dazu geführt, dass sich die Regierungspraxis in Notlagen in Bezug auf die Rolle des Präsidenten der Republik und des Verfassungsgerichts zugunsten der Exekutive verlagert hat.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This was the approach chosen by the Weimar Constitution at Article 48(2).

  2. “Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmenzustand entscheidet.”.

  3. The Statute was the constitution that Charles Albert of Sardinia granted to the Kingdom of Sardinia on March 4, 1848, and in 1861 became the constitution of the unified Kingdom of Italy. It remained in force till 1948, when it was replaced by the present-day constitution.

  4. “The King makes all appointments to offices of the state; he issues the decrees and regulations necessary for the execution of the laws, without suspending or dispensing with the observance thereof.”.

  5. “The Government may not, without an enabling act from the Houses, issue a decree having force of law.

    When the Government, in case of necessity and urgency, adopts under its own responsibility a temporary measure, it shall introduce such measure to Parliament for transposition into law. During dissolution, Parliament shall be convened within five days of such introduction.

    Such a measure shall lose effect from the beginning if it is not transposed into law by Parliament within 60 days of its publication. Parliament may regulate the legal relations arisen from the rejected measure.”.

    The law decree is also regulated by the law 400/1988.

  6. “The Rules shall establish shorter procedures to consider a Bill that has been declared urgent.”.

  7. “Parliament has the authority to declare a state of war and vest the necessary powers in the Government.”.

  8. “Regions may not levy import or export or transit duties between Regions or adopt measures that in any way obstruct the freedom of movement of persons or goods between Regions. Regions may not limit the right of citizens to work in any part whatsoever of the national territory.

    The Government can act for bodies of the regions, metropolitan cities, provinces, and municipalities if the latter fail to comply with international rules and treaties or EU legislation, or in the case of grave danger to public safety and security, or whenever such action is necessary to preserve legal or economic unity and in particular to guarantee the basic level of benefits relating to civil and social entitlements, regardless of the geographic borders of local authorities. The law shall lay down the procedures to ensure that subsidiary powers are exercised in compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and loyal co-operation.”.

  9. In particular, starting from the VI Legislature (1972–1976).

  10. “The Rules shall establish shorter procedures to consider a Bill that has been declared urgent.”.

  11. The so-called Rosatellum, law 165/2017.

  12. The approach of the Constitutional Court to the issue had previously (but also afterward) been a bit fluctuating, because it did not want to step into the political debate.

  13. The most remarkable example of the misuse of the reissuance is represented by a law decree reissued 29 times, thereby remaining in force for four years.

  14. The Court started to warn the Government against this practice already at the end of the 1980s, with the decision 302/1988.

  15. “The ordinary procedure for consideration and direct approval by the House is always followed in the case of bills on constitutional and electoral matters, delegating legislation, ratification of international treaties, and the approval of budgets and accounts.”.

  16. Article 139 is interpreted extensively: “The form of Republic shall not be a matter for constitutional amendment.”.

  17. See the decision 220/2013 on the reorganization of the Provinces.

  18. The law is entitled “Discipline on the activity of the government and of the presidency of the Council of Ministers,” thereby having a broader focus than the law decree.

  19. Decisions 29/1995, 34/2003, 171/2007. In this last decision, the Court actually struck down a law decree based on lack of proper motivation. Celotto (2007); Dickmann (2007); Ruggeri (2007).

  20. Decision 330/1996.

  21. The most relevant is the decision 22/2012.

  22. In contrast with respect to the monarchical period, which assigned such a power to the King.

  23. Law decree 625/1979, converted into law 15/1980.

  24. Marazzita (2003, p. 470 ff.); Benazzo (2004); Bonetti (2006, 2009); Neppi Modona (2006).

  25. Law 996/1970 and Presidential decree 66/1981.

  26. Law 225/1992. Malo und Severi (1995); Meloni (1998); Meoli (1997, p. 130 ff).

  27. The law 27/2012 has taken the competence for grand events out of the scope of the Protezione Civile.

  28. The Court of Audit specified the definition of grand events as events that could endanger life, private property, and public goods. However, the category is open. The Constitutional Court itself stated that the potential risk was enough to resort to emergency powers (see decision 127/1995).

  29. Cardone (2007), p. 236 ff.; Marzuoli (2006); Fioritto (2008).

  30. “The Court of Accounts exercises preventive control over the legitimacy of Government measures, and also ex-post auditing of the administration of the State Budget. It participates, in the cases and ways established by law, in auditing the financial management of the entities receiving regular budgetary support from the State. It reports directly to Parliament on the results of audits performed.”.

  31. The deliberation can be found on the website of the Court: www.cortedeiconti.it.

  32. The law 152/2005 has extended the power to issue emergency orders even for events that take place abroad.

  33. The most remarkable decisions being 26/1961, 4/1977, 201/1987 and 127/1995.

  34. This is opposite to, for example, the Weimar Constitution (Article 48) or to the French Fifth Republic Constitution (Article 16).

  35. Decision 1/2014.

  36. Cerulli Irelli (2007, p. 377 ff.); Pinelli (2009); Marazzita (2011); Acocella (2013, p. 189 ff.)

  37. Similarly, the Courts: See Council of State, Section V, decision 6280/2002.

References

  • Acocella, Giuseppe (ed.). 2013. La legalità ambigua. Turin: Giappichelli.

    Google Scholar 

  • Agamben, Giorgio. 2003. Stato di eccezione. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri.

    Google Scholar 

  • Agosta, Stefano. 2014. Dove c’è potere non c’è responsabilità. In Potere e responsabilità nello Stato costituzionale, Prospettive costituzionalistiche e penalistiche. Atti del convegno Messina, 11.2011., ed. Luigi D’Andrea, Lucia Risicato, and Antonio Saitta, 81–98. Turin: Giappichelli.

    Google Scholar 

  • Angiolini, Vittorio. 1986. Necessità ed emergenze nel diritto pubblico. Padua: Cedam.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bartole, Sergio. 2004. Interpretazioni e trasformazioni della Costituzione repubblicana. Bologna: il Mulino.

    Google Scholar 

  • Benazzo, Antonella. 2004. L’emergenza nel conflitto fra libertà e sicurezza. Turin: Giappichelli.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonetti, Paolo. 2006. Terrorismo, emergenza e costituzioni democratiche. Bologna: il Mulino.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonetti, Paolo. 2009. Problemi e prospettive costituzionali nella lotta al terrorismo in Italia. In Lotta al terrorismo e tutela dei diritti costituzionali, ed. Massimo Cavino, Mario Losano, and Chiara Tripodina, 95–116. Turin: Giappichelli.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cardone, Andrea. 2007. Le ordinanze di necessità ed urgenza del Governo. In Osservatorio sulle fonti 2006, ed. Paolo Caretti, 213–256. Turin: Giappichelli.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carlassare, Lorenza. 1990. Stati d’eccezione e sospensione delle garanzie costituzionali secondo Mortati. In Il pensiero giuridico di Costantino Mortati, ed. Mario Galizia, Paolo Grossi, 479–490. Mailand: Giuffrè.

    Google Scholar 

  • Celotto, Alfonso. 2007. C’è sempre una prima volta… (La Corte costituzionale annulla un decreto-legge per mancanza dei presupposti). Cassazione Penale 47:3599–3604.

    Google Scholar 

  • Celotto Alfonso Di Benedetto, Eleonora. 2006. Art. 77. In Commentario alla Costituzione, Vol. II, ed. Raffaele Bifulco, Alfonso Celotto, and Marco Olivetti, 1507–1530. Turin: UTET.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cerulli Irelli, Vincenzo. 2007. Principio di legalità e poteri straordinari dell’Amministrazione. Dir. Pubb 2:345–384.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dickmann, Renzo. 2007. Il decreto-legge come fonte del diritto e strumento di governo. Note a Corte cost. 23 maggio 2007, n. 171. Federalismi.it 12:1–8.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duilio, Lino. 2010. Sulle ordinanze di protezione civile. http://leg16.camera.it/temiap/temi16/rapporto_ordinanze.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 2018.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duilio, Lino. 2011. L’amministrazione dell’emergenza come “sistema normativo parallelo”. In Fuga dalla legge? Seminari sulla qualità della legislazione, ed. Roberto Zaccaria, 189–195. Brescia: Grafo.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferrajoli, Luigi. 2004. Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale. Rom, Bari: Laterza.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fioritto, Alfredo. 2008. L’amministrazione dell’emergenza tra autorità e garanzie. Bologna: il Mulino.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gandini, Fabrizio, and Andrea Montagni. 2007. La protezione civile. Profili costituzionali e amministrativi, riflessi penali. Mailand: Giuffrè.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ghisalberti, Carlo. 2000. Storia costituzionale d’Italia 1848/1948. Rom, Bari: Laterza.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malo, Maurizio, and Fabio Severo Severi. 1995. Il servizio nazionale di protezione civile. L. 24 febbraio 1992, n. 225 e norme collegate. Turin: Giappichelli.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marazzita, Giuseppe. 2003. L’emergenza costituzionale. Definizioni e modelli. Mailand: Giuffrè.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marazzita, Giuseppe. 2010. Il conflitto tra autorità e regole: il caso del potere di ordinanza. Rivista AIC 4:1–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marazzita, Giuseppe. 2011. L’irresistibile tentazione del potere di ordinanza. Osservatoriosullefonti.it 2:1–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marzuoli. 2006. Il diritto amministrativo dell’emergenza: fonti e poteri. In Annuario Associazione dei professori di diritto amministrativo. Mailand: Giuffrè.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meloni, Guido. 1998. Commento agli artt. 107 e 108 in Funzioni statali, regionali e locali nell’attuazione della legge Bassanini n. 59 del 1997. Le Regioni 3–4:819–828.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meoli, Claudio. 1997. Protezione civile (voce). In Dig. Disc. Pubbl, Vol. XII Turin: UTET.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morelli, Gerardo. 1966. La sospensione dei diritti fondamentali nello stato moderno. Milan: Giuffrè.

    Google Scholar 

  • Neppi Modona, Guido. 2006. La giurisprudenza costituzionale italiana in tema di leggi di emergenza contro il terrorismo, la mafia e la criminalità organizzata. In Democrazia e terrorismo, ed. Tania Groppi, 83–98. Neapel: Editoriale Scientifica.

    Google Scholar 

  • Patroni Griffi, Andrea. 2006. Art. 78. In Commentario alla Costituzione, Vol. II, ed. Raffaele Bifulco, Alfonso Celotto, and Marco Olivetti, 1531–1544. Turin: UTET.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pinelli, Cesare. 2009. Un sistema parallelo. Decreti-legge e ordinanze d’urgenza nell’esperienza italiana. Dir pubbl 2:317–338.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rescigno, Giuseppe Ugo. 1965. Ordinanza e provvedimenti di necessità e urgenza (voce). In Nuovissimo dig. italiano, Vol. XII, 89–94. Turin: UTET.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rimoli, Francesco. 2007. Stato di eccezione e trasformazioni costituzionali: l’enigma costituente. http://archivio.rivistaaic.it/materiali/anticipazioni/eccezione_trasformazione/index.html. Accessed 25 Jan 2018.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rolla, Giancarlo. 2015. Profili costituzionali dell’emergenza. Rivista AIC 2:1–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Romano, Santi. 1950. Sui decreti legge e lo stato di assedio in occasione del terremoto di Messina e di Reggio Calabria. In Scritti minori, ed. G. Zaniboni. Mailand: Giuffrè.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roznai, Yaniv. 2017. Unconstitutional constitutional amendments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ruggeri, Antonio. 2007. Ancora una stretta (se pur non decisiva) ai decreti-legge, suscettibile di ulteriori, ad oggi per vero imprevedibili, implicazioni a largo raggio (a margine di Corte cost. n. 171 del 2007). In Forum di Quaderni Costituzionali, 1–5.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ruggeri, Antonio. 2014. Stato costituzionale e stato d’eccezione nella più recente esperienza italiana: dalla alternative alla mutua integrazione? I quaderni europei 66:3–15.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salvia, Filippo. 2006. Il diritto amministrativo e l’emergenza derivante da cause e da fattori interni all’amministrazione. In Il diritto amministrativo dell’emergenza, A.I.P.D.A., Annuario 2005, 93–104. Mailand: Giuffrè.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmitt, Carl. 1964. Die Diktatur. Von den Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmitt, Carl. 2004. Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

    Google Scholar 

  • Siclari, Massimo. 1996. La “evidente mancanza” dei presupposti di necessità e urgenza e i decreti-legge. Italia Oggi 38:2–4.

    Google Scholar 

  • Staiano, Sandro. 2006. Brevi note su un ossimoro: l’emergenza stabilizzata. In Giurisprudenza costituzionale e principi fondamentali, ed. Sandro Staiano, 649–661. Turin: Giappichelli.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vigna, Piero Luigi, and Gianni Bellagamba. 1975. La legge sull’ordine pubblico: commento articolo per articolo alla legge 22 maggio 1975 n. 152. Mailand: Giuffrè.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law “A. Sraffa”, Bocconi University, Via Roentgen, 1, 20136, Milan, Italy

    Elisa Bertolini

Authors
  1. Elisa Bertolini
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Elisa Bertolini.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Bertolini, E. Democracy and the state of exception:. Z Politikwiss 28, 507–520 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41358-018-0148-x

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41358-018-0148-x

Search

Navigation