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Optimality of the uniform rule under single-peaked preferences

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Abstract

Consider the problem of distributing a fixed amount of a divisible resource among agents whose preferences are single-peaked. The uniform rule has been widely characterized under an ordinal utility approach. Instead, in a cardinal utility approach, we show that the uniform rule is the only consistent rule that maximizes the worst-case surplus among strategy-proof and ordinally efficient mechanisms.

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Notes

  1. The worst-case optimal mechanisms in Procaccia and Tennenholtz (2013) are variants of choosing any kth order statistic of agents’ peaks.

  2. The worst-case analysis that adopts an absolute instead of relative measure has been explored in Juarez (2008, 2015) and Moulin and Shenker (2001).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Hawaii, 2424 Maile Way, Saunders Hall 542, Honolulu, HI, 96822, USA

    Ruben Juarez

  2. Department of Economics, California State University, East Bay, Hayward, CA, USA

    Jung S. You

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  1. Ruben Juarez
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  2. Jung S. You
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Correspondence to Ruben Juarez.

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Juarez, R., You, J.S. Optimality of the uniform rule under single-peaked preferences. Econ Theory Bull 7, 27–36 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0141-z

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