Abstract
Marcello Barbieri has presented code biology as an alternative to the Peircean approach to biosemiotics. Some critics questioned the viability of code biology on grounds that Barbieri’s conception of science is limited. It has been argued that code biology’s mechanistic tendency is the cause of the allegedly limited conception of science. In this paper, I evaluate the scientific viability of the code model from the perspective of scientific realism in the philosophy of science. To be more precise, I draw on resources of the mechanistic view in philosophy (aka New Mechanistic Philosophy) to argue that far from harbouring a limited conception of science, code biology could indeed improve the scientific prospects of biosemiotics. I show that the mechanistic and model-based tendency of the code model enhances its vigour as a full-blooded scientific approach to the study of meaning in living systems. To consolidate my claim, I draw on some recent debates in the mechanistic philosophy to argue that even relational approaches to understanding the meaning in living systems—such as an approach that is defended by Vega in a recent paper—could be underpinned by mechanistic processes at a foundational level.
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Notes
According to Barbieri, “a code is: a small set of arbitrary rules selected from a potentially unlimited number in order to ensure a specific correspondence between two independent worlds” (Barbieri 2014: 4).
I thank one of the reviewers of this journal for remarking this point.
I thank one of the reviewers of this journal for bringing this point into my attention.
Obviously, the point that Nicholson does not include being organized or structured as a condition of mechanisms, even if true, does not count as an argument for Vega’s denial of Bechtel’s argument.
I thank one of the reviewers of this journal for impressing the importance of this point upon me.
For example, Levin and Martyniuk (2018) explain that morphogenesis or the emergence of large scale anatomical properties cannot be explicated on the basis of pure geometrical structures which lack temporal dimensionality. Morphogenesis is based on dynamical pattern-homeostatic processes which presumes the mechanisms of bioelectrical signalling in terms of temporal changes in such a pattern. A similar situation has been described in Ma et al.’s (2018) classification of space-time maps that compile sampled protrusion and retraction velocities. The space-time maps can be used identify distinct cell morphodynamic states and specifying functional links to underlying cytoskeleton dynamics.
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Acknowledgments
I have to thank Marcello Barbieri and Stephen Cowley for their insightful comments. I also benefited a lot from the comments of three anonymous referees of Biosemiotics as well as the journal’s editors. All of these debts are gratefully acknowledged.
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Beni, M.D. New Mechanistic Philosophy and the Scientific Prospects of Code Biology. Biosemiotics 12, 197–211 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-019-09360-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-019-09360-0