Abstract
Theodore Sider’s puzzle in Hell and Vagueness has generated some interesting responses in the past few years. In this paper, I explore yet another possible solution out of the conundrum. This solution implies three ways of denying a binary conception of the afterlife. I argue that while these solutions might first seem tenable, they might still succumb to a Sideresque revenge puzzle.
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Notes
Ever since being featured in Hajek (2016), Sider’s work has enjoyed a bit of a celebrity status among philosophers and philosophy aficionados alike.
Sider notes, however, that ‘This is not to say that God is solely responsible for the fate of created beings, for the divinely mandated criterion might contain a role for free choice.’ (2002, 58). In this paper, we will set aside the issue about the role of free choice in salvation.
The disjunction here should be interpreted in the strong, exclusive sense.
This ternary afterlife view is akin to the semantic account of gappy and glutty logics for vague sentences. For these logics, a vague sentence would not be true or false; it would be neither true nor false for a gappy logic, both true and false for a glutty one.
I am grateful to the referees of this journal for pointing this out.
I am grateful to a referee of this journal for pointing out the similarities between Dante’s eschatology and these Eastern eschatologies. For a discussion of Jain eschatology, see Sanghvi (1974); for Mahayana Buddhist eschatology, see Vasubandhu (1988); for a discussion of Dante’s Divine Comedy, see Fowlie (1981).
References
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Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Philosophical Association of Philippines-Pagarubangan 2016 Conference. My thanks go to the organizers and participants for their useful comments and suggestions. Several people have helped in developing the main points of the present version. My thanks go to Hazel Biana, Robert James Boyles, Mark Joseph Calano, Aaron Cotnoir, Mark Anthony Dacela, Dennis Edralin, James Franklin, Adrianne John Galang, Brian Garrett, Alan Hajek, Rhommel Hernandez, Dante Leoncini, Napoleon Mabaquiao, Graham Priest, Luis Sembrano, Theodore Sider, Benito Teehankee, and the anonymous referees of this journal.
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Joaquin, J.J. Hell, Heaven, Neither, or Both: the Afterlife and Sider’s Puzzle. SOPHIA 58, 401–408 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0682-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0682-5