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Hitting Retributivism Where It Hurts

  • Nathan Hanna
Original Paper
  • 122 Downloads

Abstract

Many philosophers think that, when someone deserves something, it’s intrinsically good that she get it or there’s a non-instrumental reason to give it to her. Retributivists who try to justify punishment by appealing to claims about what people deserve typically assume this view or views that entail it. In this paper, I present evidence that many people have intuitions that are inconsistent with this view. And I argue that this poses a serious challenge to retributivist arguments that appeal to desert.

Keywords

Punishment Retributivism Desert Normativity 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Drexel UniversityPhiladelphiaUSA

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