Abstract
This article puts forward solutions to some of the ethical and legal dilemmas posed in the current discussion on how to program crash algorithms in autonomous or self-driving cars. The first part of the paper defines the scope of the problem in the criminal legal field, and the next section gives a critical analysis of the proposal to always prioritise the interest of the occupant of the vehicle in situations with conflict of interests. The principle of minimizing social damage as a model for configuring self-driving cars is examined in the third section. Despite its apparent plausibility, within the framework of a liberal legal system that recognises humans as free agents who have rights and responsibilities, maximizing the function of social utility does not justify harmful interference into a person’s legal sphere. Therefore, in the fourth part, the author argues the need to program the crash algorithms of autonomous cars based on a deontological understanding of the system of justifications in criminal law. The solution to the dilemma lies in a prior analysis of the legal positions of all agents involved in the conflict, from a perspective of the principles of autonomy and solidarity as the core of the system of justifications.
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Notes
In 2020, they will be circulating independently on motorways, and in 2030 on main roads and in cities. For more details on all this, Eberl (2016, p. 170). For the various degrees of autonomous driving levels, see Both and Weber (2014, pp. 172–174). For a critical ethical analysis of the full autonomisation that turns men into mere objects to be transported, see McBride (2015).
Gurney (2016, p. 193).
McBride (2015, p. 179).
Tientrakool et al. (2011).
See Belay ( 2015, p. 122), Goodall ( 2014a, p. 59). Google provides a monthly report on details of accidents involving its self-driving cars at: https://www.google.com/selfdrivingcar/reports/.
For details on this, see van Loon and Martens (2015).
See Nyholm and Smids (2016, p. 3).
See Kumfer and Burgess (2015, p. 130). It governs fully self-driving cars without exception. The same problem arises with semi-autonomous cars, at least when the situation of necessity does not allow the driver to take over control of the vehicle in time.
And not, for example, the car itself as an entity responsible for individual decisions. For robots as beings with legal responsibility, see Asaro (2011).
For example, by using an (ethical) questionnaire to specify the set up of the car. See Fournier (2016, p. 44). This type of test, developed by The MIT, can be taken at: http://moralmachine.mit.edu.
Reticence in institutionalising tragic solutions to situations of necessity cannot justify the total prohibition of a technology that drastically reduces the number of accidents. See Hevelke and Nida-Rümelin (2015b, p. 6).
Behaviour patterns cannot be extrapolated from a descriptive ethical analysis, since it is not a case of forcing the car to do that which humans, often irrationally, do or want to do, but of obliging it to solve the problem as fairly as possible. This supposes rejecting the option to allow autonomous cars to self-program through a learning process on how cars driven by humans operate. For more on this, see Eberl (2016, pp. 308–310).
Ethical egoism, as a regulatory approach and in its widest sense, upholds that to confirm moral correctness of an action, it is necessary and at the same time sufficient, to maximise the interest or usefulness of the person acting. For more details, see Burgess-Jackson (2013, p. 532), Regis (1980, pp. 51–54).
Therefore, anyone driving on the roads would have, in principle, a reasonable interest in discontinuing manual cars in favour of self-driving ones. A different problem, which cannot be dealt with here, is how the development of autonomous cars should influence the legal assessment of the inherent risk in cars driven by humans. Should these cars be banned from the roads at some time, or should the general risk (historically legitimate) continue to be tolerated? Critical of the unjustifiable use of manual crash incompatibility vehicles (pickup trucks and sport utility vehicles), Husak (2004, pp. 355–362).
Correctly, Rachels ( 1974, pp. 298–308).
For more details, Coca-Vila (2016, pp. 248–274). Obviously, this does not mean that the wish of the passenger cannot be relevant in finding a solution to the conflict, provided it does not harm third parties.
For this view, see Hilgendorf ( 2015, p. 23).
See Bonnefon et al. (2016).
See Nyholm and Smids (2016, p. 11).
Roxin (2006, p. 736).
In detail and with later references, see Coca-Vila (2016, pp. 244–248).
With extreme clarity, Singer (1993, p. 22).
For more detail on this, see Neumann ( 2014, pp. 588–589).
§ 34 of the German Criminal Code reads as follows: Who commits an offense in imminent danger to life, limb, freedom, honor, property or another legal good which cannot be averted otherwise to avert the danger from himself or another person, does not act unlawfully, if, upon weighing the conflicting interests, in particular the affected legal goods and the degree of danger, the protected interest substantially outweighs the one interfered with. This only applies if the act committed is an appropriate way to avert the danger.
Neumann ( 2014, p. 589).
A different problem, which cannot be discussed here, is how to assess users' conduct that, by altering the algorithms of the autonomous car, ensure that it always protects them in emergency situations. Would it be acceptable here, for example, to admit excuse on the grounds of necessity? For more on this, see Engländer (2016, pp. 614–615).
On this difference, see below, in this section, n. 45.
This principle was imported into criminal law from civil law which, in turn, took the axiom from Roman private law: The casus, meaning the events that cannot be attributed to any act of human will, must generally be borne by the owner of the damaged object, the dominus. For more detail on this, see Coca-Vila (2016, pp. 387–392).
In a similar respect, see Hevelke and Nida-Rümelin (2015a, p. 223). In any case, it must be noted that the simple fact of driving shows an act of freedom by the passenger in the autonomous car, linked to regulations stating that there is a duty to accept the consequences of embarking on a hazardous action. See Hevelke and Nida-Rümelin (2015c, p. 628).
The classic argument on whether the prohibitions collide must be put aside as, in my opinion and to the contrary of the main current trend of criminal doctrine in Europe, (Zimmermann 2014, pp. 265–269), the deontic operator of the obligation is not, of itself, relevant, in resolving these conflicts. For more details, see Coca-Vila (2016, pp. 196–217).
Obligations in criminal law, as “categorical imperatives”, must not be in opposition. On the other hand, they are, by adopting Kantian terminology, the grounds of obligation. In this respect, see Timmermann (2013). The (only) obligation finally imposed in a conflict situation is, therefore, the one thought to be preferential from an assessment of the hierarchy of grounds of obligation. See further, Coca-Vila (2016, pp. 173–186).
Should there be a conflict of grounds of obligations, the relationship between the liable party and each of the victims can sometimes play an important role. Thus, for example, a father is obliged to save his son rather than an unknown minor. This second dimension to the problem is irrelevant in our example, as there is no special legal relationship between the passenger (if this person is taken as pertinent for this purpose) and the two parties involved. The “car” is obliged to comply with both, since they have equal normative force. For more details, see Coca-Vila (2016, pp. 418–429).
While self-defence provides an almost unlimited right to react, the hazard leads back to a fully attributable (wilful and culpable) act by the person who has to plead the defence. However, the defensive state of emergency grants the person affected a right to react against a person partially liable for the hazard (negligent creation, mistake of law, diminished culpability, etc.), which is substantially outweighed by the interest that is damaged. On the difference between the aggressive and the defensive states of emergency, and this in respect of self-defence, see Coca-Vila (2011), Wilenmann (2014). On the degree of responsibility for a conflict, see Segev (2014).
And this holds true for conflicts between interests or grounds of obligation. If a lifeguard can help (A) and (C), or only (B), his duty is to an alternative obligation that allows him to choose whom to rescue. The supposition is that, if the aim of saving (A) and (B) is equal, the fact that (C), who is physically close to (A), is an additional reason to be taken in account in ranking the hierarchy of obligations, seems wrong to me. On the other hand, see Kumar (2001). Again, the question is against who breaks the tie (C). In the face of metaphysical suprapersons, (C) may well be a factor in breaking the impasse, but not before (B), whose legal status is unaltered.
Scanlon (1998, pp. 229–241).
Accepted almost unanimously in the criminal doctrine of Germanic influence, Robles Planas (2010, pp. 446–448), and in depth in Wilenmann (2016). A different issue is that the probability or extent of the expected injury, as relevant factors in the weighting, may depend on personal qualities in each case, such as age or gender. The same accident might be fatal for an elderly person, but not for a young athletic person. See Kumfer and Burgess (2015, p. 133, n. 27).
Pars pro toto, Küper (1978, pp. 29–36).
For more details, Zimmermann (2009, p. 175).
For a resigned acceptance of natural distribution of the misfortune as an unavoidable toll in preventing the danger of manipulation of the established normative apportionment, see Jakobs (1993, p. 446, n. 15). On the prohibition of actively playing the part of fate or God in situations of necessity, see Coninx (2013, pp. 179–181).
On the concept of a neutral act in criminal law, see Robles Planas (2007, pp. 96–99).
Similarly, see Hevelke and Nida-Rümelin (2015a, pp. 222–224), who maintain the existence of a generic obligation of predictable behaviour.
Jakobs (1993, p. 590, n. 66).
Zimmermann (2009, pp. 184–185).
The degree of binding in the plan is variable. It is not essential for it to be a legal duty to alter the course of predictable injury. It is sufficient for the action to be generally expected, so that fulfilling it can be seen as legally neutral conduct, i.e., a purely internal configuration of the details of the final image of the hazard displayed externally.
It will not always be easy to delimit conduct altering the course that constitutes an ad hoc re-organisation of the course of injury, against one constituting a mere implementation that is legally irrelevant. Can a driver who has lost control of the vehicle and is driving on the third lane of a motorway cross over to the first lane and change the victim of the crash? The presence of lanes supposes here a certain normativisation of the expected happening, so that an unjustified change now seems to involve ad hoc reorganisation of an unacceptable course of injury. On the other hand, if a vehicle is approaching a group of pedestrians who are walking on the road and can broadly change the path the vehicle is taking, without being able to brake, there is no basis for preferring the pedestrians who, by omission, will not be harmed over those who, by omission, will. Therefore, all are domini. Less certain of this is Jakobs (1993, p. 538, n. 15).
Otto (1974, p. 121).
For more details on all this, see Joerden (2007, pp. 351–353).
Bott (2011, p. 117).
Neumann (2001, p. 430).
Duties must be prioritised according to type, for example, in a case where a duty to provide aid based on a special legal relationship (father-child) conflicts with a general duty to rescue. The first, ceteris paribus, takes precedence over the other. For more on this, see Coca-Vila (2016, pp. 275–305).
See Neumann (2014, p. 602). Moreover, it is common in criminal doctrine to differentiate between the “symmetrical community of danger”, meaning, those in which the danger and the chances of rescue are symmetrically divided, and thus each interest could be saved if others were sacrificed; and the “asymmetrical community of danger”, that in which part of the interest is irrevocably doomed to be lost. An example of the first community of danger: the captain of a hot-air balloon can only save 10 of the crew by throwing another two overboard. Otherwise the balloon would crash and kill all the passengers. And an example of the latter: two climbers have an accident and are held to a vertical rock face by a single rope that will not hold the weight of both any longer. The only way to avoid both climbers dying is for the first to cut the rope joining him to the second, saving himself and causing the death of the second climber, now “designated for death”.
Zimmermann (2014, pp. 269–271).
In the face of equal prima facie obligations, the legal system imposes an alternative duty that requires the obligor to fulfil one of the two grounds of obligation. For details on all the above, see Coca-Vila (2016, pp. 438–490).
On randomness as a decision-making mechanism, essential reading is Duxbury (1999).
The fact that deciding between two options is not necessarily irrational when there are no reasons for preference is shown very clearly in Rescher (1960, pp. 142–175).
The issue of how to set up the lottery cannot be dealt with in detail here. As I have argued elsewhere (Coca-Vila, 2016, pp. 502–507), in conflicts where human lives are at stake and it is possible to save the lives of two pedestrians to the detriment of one motorcyclist, for example, I do not believe that we are axiologically obliged to resort to a weighted lottery system that gives a 2/3 probability of escaping unharmed from a dangerous situation to two pedestrians together. Thus, on the contrary, see Broome (1984), Timmermann (2004). From the individualist claims that must govern conflict resolution, there is no justifiable reason toward the (factually) isolated victim that explains why he has to take part in the lottery under worse conditions than the other victims. Similarly, see Taurek (1977, p. 303).
It is not acceptable for the law to allow cars on the road that, faced with the conflict described above, choose to kill a person simply for being an immigrant, for example. See, for these problems, Dworkin (2011, pp. 281–284).
Küper (1983, pp. 25–28).
Pawlik (2002, p. 295).
Correctly, Pawlik (2002, p. 294).
Goodall (2014b, p. 99) understands that this would create improper disincentives. In such a case, it would be better to ride without a helmet and in an unsafe car.
The principle of solidarity limits the right of self-defence in extremely disproportionate cases, as the “reward” for previous adherence to the law and an incentive for this to be the future attitude of who is now the aggressor, Pawlik (2012, pp. 246–247).
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This work was funded by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Government of Spain, within the frame of the project entitled: “La traslación de la teoría del delito al Derecho penal económico” (Ref.: DER2013-41252-P).
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Coca-Vila, I. Self-driving Cars in Dilemmatic Situations: An Approach Based on the Theory of Justification in Criminal Law. Criminal Law, Philosophy 12, 59–82 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-017-9411-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-017-9411-3