Abstract
This paper provides a brief review of some of the central elements of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarian theory of free will. It then goes on to consider four of the central criticisms Derk Pereboom has made of Kane’s view and it shows how each of these criticisms can be reasonably answered. These criticisms are the no further power/control objection, the disappearing agent/luck objection, the randomizing manipulator objection, and the problem of responsibility for efforts of will.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For different expressions of the luck objection, see Allen (1995), Clarke (2002), Haji (1999, 2005), Mele (1998), Strawson (2000), and Waller (1988). Pereboom’s disappearing agent objection and his randomizing manipulator objection are themselves different ways of raising luck problems for Kane’s view.
In Dennett’s discussion of his own manipulation case against Kane’s view, he notes that in correspondence Kane has said that, “The indeterminacy-producing mechanism must be responsive to the dynamics within the agent’s own will and not override them or it would be making the decisions and not the agent (Dennett 2003, 133).” For a defense of Kane’s view against Dennett’s related kind of manipulation argument, see Lemos (2017, 241–242).
References
Allen, R. F. (1995). Free will and indeterminism: Robert Kane’s libertarianism. Journal of Philosophical Research, 30, 341–355.
Balaguer, M. (2010). Free will as an open scientific problem. Boston: MIT Press.
Clarke, R. (1997). On the possibility of rational free action. Philosophical Studies, 88, 37–57.
Clarke, R. (2002). Libertarian views: Critical survey of noncausal and event-causal accounts of free agency. In R. Kane (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free will (pp. 356–385). New York: Oxford University Press.
Clarke, R. (2003). Libertarian accounts of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, D. (2003). Freedom evolves. New York: Viking Press.
Haji, I. (1999). Indeterminism and Frankfurt style examples. Philosophical Explorations, 2, 42–58.
Haji, I. (2005). Libertarianism, luck, and action explanation. Journal of Philosophical Research, 30, 321–340.
Kane, R. (1996). The significance of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (1999a). Responsibility, luck, and chance: Reflections on free will and indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy, 96, 217–140.
Kane, R. (1999b). On free will, responsibility, and determinism: Response to Clarke, Haji, and Mele. Philosophical Explorations, 2, 105–121.
Kane, R. (2002). Some neglected pathways in the free will labyrinth. In R. Kane (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free will (pp. 406–437). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2007a). Libertarianism. In J. M. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, & M. Vargas (Eds.), Four views on free will (pp. 5–43). Malden: Blackwell.
Kane, R. (2007b). Response to Fischer, Pereboom, and Vargas. In J. M. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, & M. Vargas (Eds.), Four views on free will (pp. 166–183). Malden: Blackwell.
Kane, R. (2011). Rethinking free will: New perspectives on an ancient problem. In R. Kane (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free will (pp. 381–404). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2016). The complex tapestry of free will: Striving will, indeterminism, and volitional streams. Synthese., 196, 145–160. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1046-8.
Lemos, J. (2015). Self-forming acts and the grounds of responsibility. Philosophia, 43, 135–146.
Lemos, J. (2017). A libertarian response to Dennett and Harris on free will. Rivista Internazionale Di Filosofia e Psicologia, 8, 231–246.
Lemos, J. (2018). A pragmatic approach to libertarian free will. New York: Routledge.
Mele, A. (1998). Review of Robert Kane’s The Significance of Free Will. Journal of Philosophy, 95, 581–584.
Mele, A. (1999). Ultimate responsibility and dumb luck. Social Philosophy and Policy, 16, 274–293.
Mele, A. (2006). Free will and luck. New York: Oxford University Press.
Pereboom, D. (2001). Living without free will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pereboom, D. (2007a). Hard Incompatibilism. In J. M. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, & M. Vargas (Eds.), Four views on free will (pp. 85–125). Oxford: Blackwell.
Pereboom, D. (2007b). Response to Kane, Fischer, and Vargas. In J. M. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, & M. Vargas (Eds.), Four views on free will (pp. 191–203). Oxford: Blackwell.
Pereboom, D. (2014). Free will, agency, and meaning in life. New York: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, G. (2000). The unhelpfulness of indeterminism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 149–155.
Van Inwagen, P. (1983). An essay on free will. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Waller, B. (1988). Free will gone out of control. Behaviorism, 16, 149–162.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Lemos, J. Kane, Pereboom, and Event-Causal Libertarianism. Philosophia 48, 607–623 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00098-0
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00098-0