Philosophia

, Volume 44, Issue 4, pp 1351–1366 | Cite as

Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Self-Debunking?

Article

Abstract

I argue that, at least on the assumption that if there are epistemic facts they are irreducible, the evolutionary debunking maneuver is prima facie self-debunking because it seems to debunk a certain class of facts, namely, epistemic facts that prima facie it needs to rely on in order to launch its debunking arguments. I then appeal to two recent reconstructions of the evolutionary debunking maneuver (Kahane (2011), Griffiths and Wilkins (2015)) and found them wanting. Along the way I set aside two ways (one envisaged, the other by Sterpetti (2015)) to avoid the self-debunking problem that I find unpromising. I conclude that the evolutionary debunking maneuver needs to clarify the meta-epistemological commitments upon which it is supposed to operate.

Keywords

Evolutionary debunking arguments Epistemic facts Self-debunking The Milvian bridge principle 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Fabio Sterpetti for helpful correspondence, two anonymous referees as well as the participants of a workshop at the University of Amsterdam in 2015 for helpful discussion.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Classics and PhilosophyUniversity of CyprusNicosiaCyprus

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