Abstract
The hukou system is a mandatory household registration system in China that assigns an individual either an urban/non-agricultural hukou or a rural/agricultural hukou based on one’s birthplace. This system favors urban residents and discriminates against rural residents in accessing state-owned resources such as employment, education, health care, and housing. To better understand how this institutionally imposed hukou identity impacts an individual’s sense of fairness in the ultimatum game, we conducted a field experiment in China using 9–12-year-old children and collected 672 observations. Subjects played a one-shot ultimatum game to allocate 20 yuan in groups of two. We employed a 2 (hukou salience) \(\times \) 2 (proposer’s hukou type) \(\times \) 2 (responder’s hukou type) experiment design and used the strategic method ultimatum game. We primed our subjects with their hukou identity before they made their decisions in the experiment. Results of this study show that hukou salience mainly affects rural hukou subjects, who belong to the perceived less-favored social group. On one hand, when the hukou identity is made salient, rural hukou proposers decrease their amount offered regardless of their responder’s hukou type. On the other hand, rural hukou responders expect higher offers from their urban hukou proposers when the hukou identity is revealed. We interpret these results as that rural hukou subjects tend to seek compensations for their perceived hukou inferiority to achieve fair distributions.
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Notes
Student cadres are somewhat similar to student leaders. The student cadres in China are usually appointed by teachers for their excellent academic performance and leadership. The student cadres are in charge of monitoring and maintaining class rules and orders as well as tutoring other students.
Before the year of 1998, children inherit their mother’s hukou location and type.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Ministry of Education in China (Project of Humanities and Social Sciences, Grant no. 17YJCZH120) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant nos. 71703145, 71773111). We also thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.
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Appendices
Appendix
Subject characteristics by session
Session | School | Subject | Hukou type | Age | Gender | Grade level | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Urban | Rural | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | Male | Female | 4th | 5th | 6th | ||||
Control 1 | 1 | 1 | Proposer | 20 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 10 | 10 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
Responder | 20 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 10 | 10 | 6 | 7 | 7 | |||
2 | 2 | Proposer | 22 | 0 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 10 | 12 | 8 | 8 | 6 | |
Responder | 22 | 0 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 10 | 12 | 8 | 8 | 6 | |||
Control 2 | 3 | 1 | Proposer | 15 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 |
Responder | 0 | 15 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 5 | |||
4 | 2 | Proposer | 22 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 7 | 8 | |
Responder | 0 | 22 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 7 | 8 | |||
Control 3 | 5 | 1 | Proposer | 0 | 25 | 5 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 12 | 13 | 8 | 8 | 9 |
Responder | 25 | 0 | 5 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 12 | 13 | 8 | 9 | 8 | |||
6 | 2 | Proposer | 0 | 22 | 4 | 7 | 9 | 2 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 6 | 8 | |
Responder | 22 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 9 | 2 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 6 | 8 | |||
Control 4 | 7 | 1 | Proposer | 0 | 20 | 3 | 8 | 6 | 3 | 10 | 10 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
Responder | 0 | 20 | 3 | 8 | 6 | 3 | 10 | 10 | 7 | 6 | 7 | |||
8 | 2 | Proposer | 0 | 22 | 3 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 8 | 7 | |
Responder | 0 | 22 | 3 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 8 | 7 | |||
Treatment 1 | 9 | 1 | Proposer | 20 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 10 | 10 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
Responder | 20 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 10 | 10 | 6 | 7 | 7 | |||
10 | 2 | Proposer | 22 | 0 | 4 | 8 | 9 | 1 | 10 | 12 | 8 | 7 | 7 | |
Responder | 22 | 0 | 4 | 8 | 9 | 1 | 10 | 12 | 8 | 7 | 7 | |||
Treatment 2 | 11 | 1 | Proposer | 15 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 |
Responder | 0 | 15 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 5 | |||
12 | 2 | Proposer | 22 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 8 | 7 | |
Responder | 0 | 22 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 8 | 7 | |||
Treatment 3 | 13 | 1 | Proposer | 0 | 25 | 5 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 12 | 13 | 8 | 8 | 9 |
Responder | 25 | 0 | 5 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 12 | 13 | 8 | 9 | 8 | |||
14 | 2 | Proposer | 0 | 22 | 3 | 8 | 9 | 2 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 7 | |
Responder | 22 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 9 | 2 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 7 | |||
Treatment 4 | 15 | 1 | Proposer | 0 | 20 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 10 | 10 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
Responder | 0 | 20 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 10 | 10 | 7 | 6 | 7 | |||
16 | 2 | Proposer | 0 | 22 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 7 | 8 | |
Responder | 0 | 22 | 3 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 7 | 8 | |||
Total | 336 | 336 | 100 | 242 | 240 | 90 | 336 | 336 | 224 | 224 | 224 | |||
Hukou perceptions
The figures above present the subject answers to the pre-experiment survey questions regarding hukou perceptions. For example, the top left figure shows the subject answers to the question “who pays higher tuition and fees at school, a rural hukou student or an urban hukou student?” In the rural hukou group, about 8% of the subjects believe that urban hukou students pay higher tuition and fees, 6% believe that rural hukou students pay more, 56% believe that rural hukou and urban hukou students pay the same amount, and 30% say that they do not know. In the urban hukou group, 10% believe that urban hukou students pay more, 4% believe that rural hukou students pay more, 53% believe that they pay the same amount, and 33% say that they do not know. The rest of the figures can be interpreted by the same token.
Wilcoxon signed-rank test results on hukou perceptions
Question | Beliefs | Among rural hukou subjects | Among urban hukou subjects |
|---|---|---|---|
Who pays higher tuition | \(\hbox {Urban} > \hbox {rural}\) | \({z}=0.571; {p}=0.798\) | \({z}=0.863; {p}=0.561\) |
\(\hbox {Urban} < \hbox {do not know}\) | \({z}=-\,2.843; {p}=0.030\)** | \({z}=-\,2.786; {p}=0.031\)** | |
Who is more likely to become a student cadre | \(\hbox {Urban} > \hbox {rural}\) | \({z}=2.564; {p}=0.036\)** | \({z}=3.988; {p}=0.007\)*** |
\(\hbox {Urban} > \hbox {do not know}\) | \({z}=2.013; {p}=0.048\)** | \({z}=3.105; {p}=0.022\)** | |
Who is more likely to be recognized | \(\hbox {Urban} > \hbox {rural}\) | \({z}=1.164; {p}=0.206\) | \({z}=1.356; {p}=0.110\) |
\(\hbox {Urban} < \hbox {do not know}\) | \({z}=-\,3.023; {p}=0.026\)** | \({z}=-\,2.512; {p}=0.038\)** | |
Who receives higher daily allowance | \(\hbox {Urban} > \hbox {rural}\) | \({z}=4.096; {p}=0.005\)*** | \({z}=4.525; {p}=0.003\)*** |
\(\hbox {Urban} > \hbox {do not know}\) | \({z}=2.125; {p}=0.042\)** | \({z}=1.976; {p}=0.052\)* |
The table above presents the Wilcoxon signed-rank test results for the comparisons between subjects’ hukou perceptions. the two hukou groups. For example, the second row shows the test results regarding the question “who pays higher tuition and fees at school, a rural hukou student or an urban hukou student?” Among the rural hukou subjects, the difference between the percentages believing urban hukou students pay more and rural hukou students pay more is not statistically significant (\({z}=0.571, {p}=0.798\)). Among the urban hukou subjects, this difference is statistically insignificant as well (\({z}=0.863, {p}=0.561\)). The same analogy applies to other questions of “who is more likely to become a student cadre, a rural hukou student or an urban hukou student,” “who is more likely to be recognized at school, a rural hukou student or an urban hukou student,” and “who receives higher daily allowances, and a rural hukou student or an urban hukou student.” We find that subjects of both hukou groups believe that rural hukou students and urban hukou students pay the same amount of tuition and fees and are equally likely to be recognized at school. However, both rural and urban hukou students perceive that urban hukou students are more likely to become student cadres and receive more daily allowances from parents, although the data in subject characteristics do not show that there is a difference.
Ultimatum game outcomes with children subjects
Experiment location | Subjects | Sample size | Average offer\({}^\text {a}\) | Std | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Harbaugh et al. (2003) | Oregon, USA | 2nd graders | 74 | 0.35 | 0.17 |
4th graders | 106 | 0.41 | 0.16 | ||
9th graders | 90 | 0.45 | 0.09 | ||
12th graders | 40 | 0.41 | 0.07 | ||
Murnighan and Saxon (1998) | Illinois, USA | 6th graders | 60 | 0.45 | 0.12 |
9th graders | 58 | 0.40 | 0.14 | ||
Sally and Hill (2006) | London, UK | 6 years old | 14 | 0.50 | 0.13 |
8 years old | 19 | 0.36 | 0.15 | ||
10 years old | 18 | 0.41 | 0.12 | ||
Takezawa et al. (2006) | Berlin, Germany | 6th graders | 51 | 0.46 | 0.16 |
8th graders | 48 | 0.53 | 0.25 | ||
Zhu et al. (2008) | Beijing, China | 3rd graders | 48 | 0.59 | 0.23 |
8th graders | 48 | 0.52 | 0.09 | ||
Yu (2014) | Fuzhou, China | 4 years old | 36 | 0.33 | 0.17 |
5 years old | 36 | 0.41 | 0.16 | ||
6 years old | 36 | 0.51 | 0.12 |
Experiment instructions (for proposers)
The following appendixes are the English translations of our experiment instructions, decision cards, pre-experiment survey, and post-experiment survey. The original documents are written in Chinese.
Your game ID:
_____
Greetings! Welcome to this experiment conducted by Zhejiang University. This experiment will take about 30 min of your time.
General instructions
-
You will play a game and earn cash in this experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully and make sure that you understand all of them before you make your decision. The decision you make will determine the amount of money you receive at the end of this experiment. You will be paid 5 yuan for your participation, in addition to whatever you make in the game. In other words, your total earnings of today’s experiment will equal to whatever you make in the game, plus 5 yuan participation fee.
-
You are not allowed to talk during the game. If you have any question, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come and answer your question in private. You will be asked to terminate the game and leave the room if you speak with another participant, and we will not be able to pay you in such situation.
-
All your personal information, including your game decision, answers to the survey questions, and the amount you earn from this game will be kept private.
-
Please do not share your decision with any other participants throughout the experiment.
-
You will do two practice questions before the game starts. You have to answer both of them correctly to proceed with the game. The purpose of these practice questions is to make sure that you fully understand the game instructions and know how to calculate your earnings correctly.
Game procedures
-
1.
You will pick one card out of a deck of cards. The number on the card will be your game ID.
-
2.
You will be paired with one person in the other room to play this game. Your partner will be the person who has the same card number (game ID). You will not meet your partner throughout this experiment. You may or may not have met your partner before.
-
3.
You will receive 20 yuan from us. You have to decide how to allocate this money between yourself and your partner. You will be given a list of choices. Please indicate your decision by checking the box in front of the choice you make.
-
4.
If your partner accepts your proposal, then you and your partner will receive whatever you have proposed plus 5 yuan participation fee for each of you. If your partner rejects your proposal, then both of you will receive 0. However, each of you will still receive 5 yuan for your participation.
-
5.
You have 5 min to make a decision. When time is up, we will collect your decision card and pass it to your partner. After your partner has made his or her decision, we will give your decision card back to you. You will have the chance to confirm your final payment.
-
6.
You will receive a questionnaire after you hand in your decision card. Your answers to these questions will be kept private. Please respond carefully and truthfully. You have 5 min to answer these questions.
-
7.
Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire. The experimenter will call your game ID one by one and pay you privately. Only you and the experimenter will know your earnings. No other participant will know how much you have made in the game.
Practice questions
You have to answer both of these questions correctly to proceed.
-
1.
For example, in the game, you choose to keep 11 yuan for yourself and give 9 yuan to your partner. The lowest amount your partner is willing to accept is 8 yuan. In this case, you will get
_____ yuan, and your partner will get 
_____ yuan. -
2.
For example, in the game, you choose to keep 11 yuan for yourself and give 9 yuan to your partner. The lowest amount your partner is willing to accept is 10 yuan. In this case, you will get
_____ yuan, and your partner will get 
_____ yuan.
_____ yuan, and your partner will get 
_____ yuan.
_____ yuan, and your partner will get 
_____ yuan.Experiment instructions (for responders)
Your game ID:
_____
Greetings! Welcome to this experiment conducted by Zhejiang University. This experiment will take about 30 min of your time.
General instructions
-
You will play a game and earn cash in this experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully and make sure that you understand all of them before you make your decision. The decision you make will determine the amount of money you receive at the end of this experiment. You will be paid 5 yuan for your participation, in addition to whatever you make in the game. In other words, your total earnings of today’s experiment will equal to whatever you make in the game, plus 5 yuan participation fee.
-
You are not allowed to talk during the game. If you have any question, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come and answer your question in private. You will be asked to terminate the game and leave the room if you speak with another participant, and we will not be able to pay you in such situation.
-
All your personal information, including your game decision, answers to the survey questions, and the amount you earn from this game will be kept private.
-
Please do not share your decision with any other participants throughout the experiment.
-
You will do two practice questions before the game starts. You have to answer both of them correctly to proceed with the game. The purpose of these practice questions is to make sure that you fully understand the game instructions and know how to calculate your earnings correctly.
Game procedures
-
1.
You will pick one card out of a deck of cards. The number on the card will be your game ID.
-
2.
You will be paired with one person in the other room to play this game. Your partner will be the person who has the same card number (game ID). You will not meet your partner throughout this experiment. You may or may not have met your partner before.
-
3.
Your partner will receive 20 yuan from us. Your partner will allocate this money between you and him or herself.
-
4.
You have to decide the lowest amount that you are willing to accept. You have 5 min to make a decision.
-
5.
If your partner’s offer is equal or higher than the lowest amount that you are willing to accept, then both of you will receive what your partner has proposed plus 5 yuan participation fee for each of you. If your partner’s offer is lower than the lowest amount that you are willing to accept, then both you and your partner will receive 0. However, each of you will still receive 5 yuan for your participation.
-
6.
You will receive a questionnaire after you hand in your decision card. Your answers to these questions will be kept private. Please respond carefully and truthfully. You have 5 min to answer these questions.
-
7.
Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire. The experimenter will call your game ID one by one and pay you privately. Only you and the experimenter will know your earnings. No other participant will know how much you have earned from the game.
Practice questions
You have to answer both of these questions correctly to proceed.
-
1.
For example, in the game, your partner chooses to keep 11 yuan for him or herself and offers you 9 yuan. The lowest amount you are willing to accept is 8 yuan. In this case, you will get
_____ yuan, and your partner will get 
_____ yuan. -
2.
For example, in the game, your partner chooses to keep 11 yuan for him or herself and offers you 9 yuan. The lowest amount you are willing to accept is 10 yuan. In this case, you will get
_____ yuan, and your partner will get 
_____ yuan.
_____ yuan, and your partner will get 
_____ yuan.
_____ yuan, and your partner will get 
_____ yuan.Proposer’s decision card (for control groups with private hukou identity)
Your game ID:
_____
Your partner’s game ID:
_____
You are a proposer. You have to allocate 20 yuan between you and your partner. Please make your decision by checking one of the brackets below.
-
( ) Keep 20 yuan for yourself, give 0 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 19 yuan for yourself, give 1 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 18 yuan for yourself, give 2 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 17 yuan for yourself, give 3 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 16 yuan for yourself, give 4 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 15 yuan for yourself, give 5 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 14 yuan for yourself, give 6 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 13 yuan for yourself, give 7 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 12 yuan for yourself, give 8 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 11 yuan for yourself, give 9 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 10 yuan for yourself, give 10 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 9 yuan for yourself, give 11 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 8 yuan for yourself, give 12 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 7 yuan for yourself, give 13 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 6 yuan for yourself, give 14 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 5 yuan for yourself, give 15 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 4 yuan for yourself, give 16 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 3 yuan for yourself, give 17 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 2 yuan for yourself, give 18 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 1 yuan for yourself, give 19 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 0 yuan for yourself, give 20 yuan to your partner.
Proposer’s decision card (for treatment groups with salient hukou identity)
Your game ID:
_____
Your hukou type: urban
Your partner’s game ID:
_____
Your partner’s hukou type: rural
You are a proposer. You have to allocate 20 yuan between you and your partner. Please make your decision by checking one of the brackets below.
-
( ) Keep 20 yuan for yourself, give 0 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 19 yuan for yourself, give 1 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 18 yuan for yourself, give 2 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 17 yuan for yourself, give 3 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 16 yuan for yourself, give 4 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 15 yuan for yourself, give 5 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 14 yuan for yourself, give 6 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 13 yuan for yourself, give 7 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 12 yuan for yourself, give 8 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 11 yuan for yourself, give 9 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 10 yuan for yourself, give 10 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 9 yuan for yourself, give 11 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 8 yuan for yourself, give 12 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 7 yuan for yourself, give 13 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 6 yuan for yourself, give 14 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 5 yuan for yourself, give 15 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 4 yuan for yourself, give 16 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 3 yuan for yourself, give 17 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 2 yuan for yourself, give 18 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 1 yuan for yourself, give 19 yuan to your partner.
-
( ) Keep 0 yuan for yourself, give 20 yuan to your partner.
Responder’s decision card (for control groups with private hukou identity
Your game ID:
_____
Your partner’s game ID:
_____
You are a responder. You have to decide the lowest amount that you would like to accept from the proposer.
The lowest amount you are willing to accept from your partner is 
_____ yuan.
Responder’s decision card (for treatment groups with salient hukou identity)
Your game ID:
_____
Your hukou type: urban
Your partner’s game ID:
_____
Your partner’s hukou type: rural
You are a responder. You have to decide the lowest amount that you would like to accept from the proposer.
The lowest amount you are willing to accept from your partner is 
_____ yuan.
Pre-experiment survey (for treatment groups only)
-
1.
Your sex:
_____ -
2.
Your age:
_____ -
3.
Your ethnic group:
_____ -
4.
Your grade level:
_____ -
5.
Your hukou location:
_____ Province 
_____ City 
_____ County/DistrictCheck here ( ) if you do not know your hukou location.
-
6.
How long have you been living in this county/city ?
_____ -
7.
Can you speak the local dialect? ( ) Yes ( ) No
-
8.
Do you consider yourself a local? ( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) Do not know
-
9.
Do your classmates consider you a local? ( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) Do not know
-
10.
Do your teachers consider you a local? ( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) Do not know
-
11.
Who pays higher tuition and fees at school, a rural hukou student or an urban hukou student?
( ) A rural hukou student ( ) An urban hukou student ( ) They pay the same amount ( ) Do not know
-
12.
Who is more likely to become a student cadre, a rural hukou student or an urban hukou student?
( ) A rural hukou student ( ) An urban hukou student ( ) Do not know
-
13.
Who is more likely to be recognized at school, a rural hukou student or an urban hukou student?
( ) A rural hukou student ( ) An urban hukou student ( ) Do not know
-
14.
Who receives more daily allowance from parents, a rural hukou student or an urban hukou student?
( ) A rural hukou student ( ) An urban hukou student ( ) Do not know
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____ Province 
_____ City 
_____ County/District
_____Post-experiment survey (for all subjects)
-
1.
Your sex:
_____ -
2.
Your age:
_____ -
2.
Your ethnic group:
_____ -
4.
Your grade level:
_____ -
5.
Are you a student cadre? ( ) Yes ( ) No
-
6.
How many siblings do you have? ( ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) more than 3
-
7.
What is your father’s education level?
( ) Illiterate ( ) Elementary school ( ) Middle school ( ) High school ( ) College ( ) Graduate school
-
8.
What is your mother’s education level?
( ) Illiterate ( ) Elementary school ( ) Middle school ( ) High school ( ) College ( ) Graduate school
-
9.
What is your current academic standing?
( ) Top tier ( ) Above average ( ) Average ( ) Below average ( ) Bottom tier
-
10
How much money do your parents give you on a typical day, excluding the amount for transportation and meals?
( ) \(< 1\) yuan ( ) 1–1.99 yuan ( ) 2–2.99 yuan ( ) 3–3.99 yuan ( ) 4–4.99 yuan ( ) \(\ge \) 5 yuan
_____
_____
_____
_____Rights and permissions
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Cite this article
Luo, J., Chen, Y., He, H. et al. Hukou identity and fairness in the ultimatum game. Theory Decis 87, 389–420 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09700-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09700-z