Abstract
In most, if not all, forms of epistocracy, we can expect (at least in the near future) that the more advantaged demographic groups would have higher rates of representation than less advantaged groups. The Demographic Objection to Epistocracy holds that this means epistocracy is unjust. One version of the Demographic Objection holds that the unequal representation is inherently unfair. I show that this argument fails, as proceduralist concern for fairness does not get us to universal equal suffrage at all. A second version holds that by giving some kinds of people more power than others, epistocracy will tend to help the advantaged and harm the already disadvantaged. In contrast, I argue that certain forms of epistocracy escape this objection altogether. For the others, though, this version of the objection relies on questionable empirical assumptions. In the end, neither version of the Demographic Objection succeeds. The Demographic Objection to epistocracy is much weaker than it seems.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Change history
11 January 2018
The above-mentioned article was published online with an incorrect title. The correct title reads “Does the Demographic Objection to Epistocracy Succeed?”
Notes
As Claudio López-Guerra (2014) points out, no modern democracy is fully democratic so defined, as they exclude children and most long-term foreign residents, and many also exclude convicted felons.
If democrats deny this point, they do so at their own peril. After all, if what the government does in a modern democracy were entirely independent of what the electorate wants, that would invalidate the epistocrat’s objection to democracy, but would also seems to invalidate the democrat’s argument for democracy. If the electorate has no power, then why bother to defend democracy? (How could universal suffrage matter if government leaders completely ignore the electorate’s preferences?) But if, more plausibly, the electorate has at least some power, then the epistocrat’s complaints stand.
Via email, López-Guerra confirmed that he regards his system as epistocratic, though he thinks the label ‘aristocratic’ is better.
See Brennan (2016, pp. 74–139), for a critique of deontological arguments for an equal right to vote.
See Brennan (2016) for some evidence for such claims.
In the United States, African Americans typically have a lower overall turnout than whites. However, there is some evidence that once we control for socio-economic status and other factors that influence voting turnout, African Americans actually vote in higher rates than whites. For instance, African Americans vote less than whites, because they are more likely to be poor, not because they are African American. However, this probably does not matter for the purposes of the Demographic Argument. See Leighley and Nagler (1992).
For a contrary view, see Enns and Wlezien (2011).
See the tables available at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, URL: http://www.idea.int.
References
Achen, Christopher, and Larry Bartels. 2016. Democracy for Realists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Althaus, Scott. 2003. Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bartels, Larry. 1996. Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections. American Journal of Political Science 40: 194–230.
Bell, Daniel. 2015. The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Birch, Sarah. 2009a. The Case for Compulsory Voting. Public Policy Research 16: 21–27.
Birch, Sarah. 2009b. Full Participation. Manchester: University of Manchester Press.
Brennan, Jason. 2011. The Right to a Competent Electorate. Philosophical Quarterly 61: 700–724.
Brennan, Jason. 2016. Against Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Brenan, Jason, and Lisa Hill. 2014. Compulsory Voting: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Caplan, Bryan. 2007. The Myth of the Rational Voter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Christiano, Thomas. 1996. The Rule of the Many. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Christiano, Thomas. 2008. The Constitution of Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Citrin, Jack, and Donald Green. 1990. The Self-Interest Motive in American Public Opinion. Research in Micropolitics 3: 1–28.
Conover, Pamela, Stanley Feldman, and Kathleen Knight. 1987. The Personal and Political Underpinnings of Economic Forecasts. American Journal of Political Science 3: 559–583.
Delli-Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Efrain, Michael, and E. W. J. Patterson. 1974. Voters Vote Beautiful: The Effect of Physical Appearance on a National Election. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 6: 352–356.
Enns, Peter K. and Christopher Wlezien (eds.). 2011. Who Gets Represented?, 2011. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Estlund, David. 2008. Democratic Authority. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Feddersen, Timothy, Sean Gailmard, and Alvaro Sandroni. 2009. A Bias toward Unselfishness in Large Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence. American Political Science Review 103: 175–192.
Funk, Carolyn. 2000. The Dual Influence of Self-Interest and Societal Interest in Public Opinion. Political Research Quarterly 53: 37–62.
Funk, Carolyn, and Patricia Garcia-Monet. 1997. The Relationship Between Personal and National Concerns in Public Perceptions of the Economy. Political Research Quarterly 50: 317–342.
Gilens, Martin. 2012. Affluence and Influence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Guerrero, Alex. 2014. Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative. Philosophy & Public Affairs 42: 135–178.
Hill, Lisa. 2002. On Compelling Citizens to Vote. Political Studies 50: 80–101.
Huddy, Leonie, Jeffrey Jones, and Richard Chard. 2001. Compassion vs. Self-Interest: Support for Old-Age Programs Among the Non-elderly. Political Psychology 22: 443–472.
Kinder, Donald, and Roderick Kiewiet. 1979. Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting. American Journal of Political Science 23: 495–527.
Landemore, Hélène. 2012. Democratic Reason. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lau, Richard, and David Redlawsk. 2006. How Voters Decide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leighley, Jan E., and Jonathan Nagler. 1992. Individual and Systematic Influences on Voter Turnout: 1984. Journal of Politics 54: 718–740.
López-Guerra, Claudio. 2014. Democracy and Disenfranchisement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Markus, Gregory. 1988. The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis. American Journal of Political Science 32: 137–154.
Mill, John Stuart. 1991 [1861]. Considerations on Representative Government. New York, NY: Prometheus Books.
Miller, Dale. 1999. The Norm of Self-Interest. American Psychologist 54: 1053–1060.
Mulligan, Thomas. 2017a. Justice and the Meritocratic State. New York, NY: Routledge Press.
Mulligan, Thomas. 2017b. Plural Voting for the Twenty First Century. Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx046.
Mutz, Diana, and Jeffrey Mondak. 1997. Dimensions of Sociotropic Behavior: Group-Based Judgments of Fairness and Well-Being. American Journal of Political Science 41: 284–308.
Ponza, Michael, Greg Duncan, Mary Corcoran, and Fred Groskind. 1988. The Guns of Autumn? Age Differences in Support for Income Transfers to the Young and Old. Public Opinion Quarterly 52: 441–466.
Rhodebeck, Laurie. 1993. The Politics of Greed? Political Preferences Among the Elderly. Journal of Politics 55: 342–364.
Sears, David O., and Carolyn L. Funk. 1990. Self-Interest in Americans’ Political Opinions. In Beyond Self-Interest, ed. Jane Mansbridge, 147–170. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Sears, David, Carl Hensler, and Leslie Speer. 1979. Whites’ Opposition to ‘Busing’: Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics? American Political Science Review 73: 369–384.
Sears, David, and Richard Lau. 1983. Inducing Apparently Self-Interested Political Preferences. American Journal of Political Science 27: 223–252.
Sears, David, Richard Lau, Tom Tyler, and Harris Allen. 1980. Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting. American Political Science Review 74: 670–684.
Somin, Ilya. 2013. The Problem of Political Ignorance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
The original version of this article was revised: The title of the article has been changed to Does the Demographic Objection to Epistocracy Succeed?
An erratum to this article is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-017-9390-1.
A correction to this article is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-017-9390-1.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Brennan, J. Does the Demographic Objection to Epistocracy Succeed?. Res Publica 24, 53–71 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-017-9385-y
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-017-9385-y