Abstract
In this paper, I ask what is wrong with sufficiency. I formulate a generic sufficiency principle in relation to which I discuss possible problems for sufficientarianism. I argue against the arbitrariness–concern, that sufficiency theory need only to identify a possible space for determining a plausible threshold, and I argue against the high–low threshold dilemma concern, that multiple-threshold views can solve this dilemma. I then distinguish between currency-pluralist and currency-monist multiple-threshold views and test them against two different versions of the widely shared ‘ignorance of inequality objection’ to sufficientarianism—a benefit-driven and a burden-driven version. I argue that currency-pluralist sufficiency views are better capable of responding to the former than currency-monist views. However, I show that no existing sufficiency view can provide a plausible response to the burden-driven version. Hence, I conclude that the problem of unequal distribution of burdens above the thresholds represents an overlooked threat to the sufficiency view, in any version.
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Notes
Note that Fourie focuses on the distinction between the first two forms of pluralism, and only very briefly mentions currency-pluralism (2016, p. 19). The definition of currency-pluralism given here is captured by Axelsen and Nielsen in the term ‘aspect pluralism’ (Axelsen and Nielsen 2016); it is acknowledged in Nussbaum’s ‘non-commensurability’ claim (2006, p. 166); and it was also recognised by Cohen in his intentionally vaguely delimited ‘midfare’ space for the currency of egalitarian justice (1993).
Setting aside ‘quasi-positional aspects’ (such as education) referring to non-positional aspects that have a direct spill-over relation to positional aspects.
See among others Holtug’s version of the same objection (Holtug 2011).
However, since he notes that the reasonability amendment is only for reasons of feasibility, it might seem as if Huseby is still grounding the threshold on subjective grounds.
Such as found in Segall’s luck egalitarianism (Segall 2010).
A similar argument has recently been made by Claassen (2016).
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Nielsen, L. What is Wrong with Sufficiency?. Res Publica 25, 21–38 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-017-9377-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-017-9377-y